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There is resounding consensus that diversity in legal education is a priority. Yet, North 
American law schools continue to be criticized for failing to reflect the diversity of the society 
that they are training lawyers to serve. This article is a project of conceptual reorientation 
against a backdrop of critical scholarship and empirical evidence. Parts I and II examine the 
past twenty years of diversity promotion in legal education, concluding that, while several 
advances have been made, especially in increasing numerical representation of diverse 
groups in law schools, the promise of meaningful diversity remains unfulfilled. Part III 
suggests that reforms in legal education, though well-intentioned, have continued to focus 
on the production of a model of professional identity that is out of reach and out of touch for 
many minority students. In Parts IV and V, the author outlines a program for transforming 
the norm of lawyering taught in law school. Grounded in a normative framework of access 
to justice and equality, the author argues that experiential/clinical learning practices offer 
a useful method to achieve a more engaged pedagogical commitment to diversity in legal 
education.
Personne ne réfute que la diversité devrait constituer une priorité dans la formation 
juridique. Pourtant, les écoles de droit d’Amérique du Nord continuent d’être critiquées pour 
ne pas refléter la diversité de la société au service de laquelle œuvreront les avocats qu’elles 
forment. Cet article constitue le projet d’une réorientation conceptuelle sur fond d’érudition 
critique et de témoignage empirique. Ses première et deuxième parties passent en revue 
les vingt dernières années de promotion de la diversité dans la formation juridique, pour 
conclure que, même si plusieurs progrès ont été réalisés, particulièrement grâce à une 
plus forte représentation numérique des groupes de la diversité dans les écoles de droit, la 
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promesse d’une diversité digne de ce nom demeure non remplie. La troisième partie établit 
que les réformes de la formation juridique, quoique bien intentionnées, continuent de cibler la 
création d’un modèle d’identité professionnelle hors d’atteinte et déconnecté pour beaucoup 
d’étudiants minoritaires. Dans les quatrième et cinquième parties, l’auteur propose un 
programme destiné à transformer l’image de la profession d’avocat qu’enseignent les écoles 
de droit. S’appuyant sur un cadre normatif de l’accès à la justice et de l’égalité, l’auteur 
prétend qu’un enseignement expérientiel et clinique constitue un moyen utile d’atteindre un 
engagement pédagogique plus intense envers la diversité dans la formation juridique.
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LEGAL EDUCATION IN NORTH AMERICA IS CHANGING. These changes are 
occurring at a time when law schools are under intense pressures from a variety 
of forces, many of which are beyond anyone’s control.1 One important push, 
both in legal education and in the profession,2 is to better implement formal 
commitments to diversity. This push for diversity occurs at the nexus of at least 
three related developments in law schools across North America.3 First, there 
is a consensus that diversity is both a social fact and a public good, deserving 
of efforts to foster and promote it institutionally. Secondly, well-known reform 
initiatives have aimed to diversify the demographic composition of the law school 
by admitting students and appointing faculty members from historically under-
represented communities. Finally, law teachers are approaching legal education 
more critically than ever and are embracing innovative teaching practices, most 
notably experiential education. Although questions about how to educate and 
train lawyers are not novel—the core model has persisted despite incessant 
1. Harry Arthurs, “The Future of Law School: Three Visions and a Prediction” (2014) 51:4 
Alb L Rev 705 [Arthurs, “Three Visions”] (arguing that the “future of law school depends 
on … developments in political economy, technology, demography and society that are 
reconfiguring the legal system, the market for professional services and the structure of higher 
education” at 705).
2. For definitional purposes, when speaking of “legal education,” I refer to the provision 
of training and educational services to students who will subsequently be eligible for 
membership in a bar. This education occurs in faculties housed within institutions of higher 
learning, known colloquially as “law schools,” and is carried out by a high proportion of 
tenured, full-time law professors, with a smaller number of part-time or adjunct faculty, 
many of whom maintain active professional lives. When speaking of the “legal profession,” 
I refer to the professionally constituted corps of licensed lawyers in the relevant jurisdiction. 
Although every jurisdiction has a professional corps of lawyers, there is sufficient variation 
in the modes of organizing and regulating lawyers—and in the business, cultural, political, 
and interpersonal relations among lawyers—that my reference here is specific to the legal 
profession in the province of Ontario, Canada. I suggest that the relevance of one sizable 
English-speaking, North American jurisdiction (population: twelve million) with a largely 
urban, middle-class, and multicultural population is a good general reference point from 
which many analogues may be drawn to jurisdictions with similar demographic features.
3. I use the province of Ontario in Canada as a case study, but generalize many observations 
to North American law school experience broadly. Legal education and the legal profession 
across North American jurisdictions share many similar features and exist amid relatively 
comparable legal cultures, socio-political conditions, and institutional structures.
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critique4—the call for a more substantial and structural review of the modes of 
legal education has reached fever pitch.5 
Issues about access to and delivery of legal education relate, both causally 
and contextually, to issues about access to and delivery of legal services. The 
interconnection of legal education and the provision of legal services in a profit-
driven market has meant that market collapse tethers the future of law schools to 
economic interests. One effect of this interconnection, evident in recent develop-
ments in law school accreditation and lawyer licensing, is that law schools are 
expected to produce “practice-ready” graduates.6 Whether this will lead to radical 
4. See Benjamin A Spencer, “The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective” (2012) 69:4 
Wash & Lee L Rev 1949 (summarizing the history of legal education in the United States, 
and noting that “when one canvases the various assessments of formal legal education over 
the past 130 years, it is remarkable how consistent the criticisms are and how persistent the 
Langdellian model has been in the face of these critiques” at 1982). Modern American legal 
education, developed by Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School 
beginning in 1870, also became the dominant model in Canada. See Ian Holloway, “Future 
of Law Conference: The Evolved Context of Legal Education” (2013) 76:1 Sask L Rev 133 at 
134. Holloway argues:
The system of legal education as we know it in Canada today is a creature of the American 
industrial revolution. It is not, despite what we might instinctively assume, grounded in the 
antiquity of the common law system. Rather, it stemmed from a move in the aftermath of the 
US Civil War to make the education of lawyers both more “scientific” and more rigorous. And 
it endures to this day.
5. See Alfred Zantzinger Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law: Historical 
Development and Principal Contemporary Problems of Legal Education in the United States with 
Some Account of Conditions in England and Canada (New York: The Carnegie Foundation for 
the Advancement of Teaching, 1921); American Bar Association Section of Legal Education 
and Admission to the Bar, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: 
Narrowing the Gap (Chicago: American Bar Association, July 1992); William M Sullivan et 
al, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass for the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2007) [Carnegie Report]; Richard 
Susskind, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).
6. This is especially true in the United States where, since the late 2000s, the American Bar 
Association Accreditation Committee has moved towards requiring law schools to produce 
“practice-ready” graduates. See generally Margaret Martin Barry, “Practice Ready: Are 
We There Yet?” (2012) 32:2 Boston College J L & Soc Just 247. In Canada, the shift to 
practice readiness occurs in a different historical and socioeconomic context. Critics in both 
countries doubt whether practice readiness is useful as an accreditation standard. See Robert 
J Condlin, “‘Practice Ready Graduates’: A Millennialist Fantasy” (University of Maryland 
Legal Studies Research Paper No 2013-48), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316093> 
(describing law graduates’ job prospects as “a function of a school’s academic reputation, not 
its curriculum” and arguing that “the legal labor market will rebound only after the market 
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reform in professional norms or a pandering to established interests remains to be 
seen.7 Much will depend on the values and ambitions identified by law teachers 
and the strategies adopted to advance them.8 For these reasons, legal education is 
inextricably tied to issues of professional regulation and access to justice, which 
makes it both timely and appropriate to consider the implications of specific 
commitments to diversity within the context of these broader factors. 
Building on these observations, I begin this article with two descriptive 
claims. The first, discussed in Parts I and II, is that diversity promotion is a 
universally recognized normative goal that has been the subject of institu-
tional initiatives within legal education and the legal profession. Law schools 
are influenced by the values of the professional world of lawyers, especially as 
directed by the self-governing bodies of the profession as well as by diversity 
promotion commitments within the academy and in university policy. Yet, while 
the normative case for diversity has been embraced widely and at all levels, these 
declarations and promises tend to lack articulation of what diversity means as 
a substantive concept. In this sense, diversity pedagogy in North American law 
schools to date can be described as “thin.” 
The second descriptive claim, which I outline in Part III, is that the current 
state of affairs with respect to diversity issues in the law school reveals that 
institutional initiatives to promote diversity have brought some advancement, 
but incomplete results. This claim will be developed with reference to a variety 
as a whole has rebounded (and perhaps not then)” at 4). See also Holloway, supra note 4 at 
137 (arguing that “to define the goals of legal education by reference to what a young lawyer 
needs to begin private legal practice is short-sighted,” given the changes occurring within the 
profession and the varied types of legal careers that young lawyers can expect to have over the 
course of their careers). 
7. See Larry E Ribstein, “Practicing Theory: Legal Education for the Twenty-First Century” 
(2011) 96:5 Iowa L Rev 1649; Carrie Hempel & Carroll Seron, “An Innovative Approach 
to Legal Education: The Founding of the University of California, Irvine School of Law” in 
Scott L Cummings, ed, The Paradox of Professionalism: Lawyers and the Possibility of Justice 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 169.
8. See Arthurs, “Three Visions”, supra note 1. Arthurs argues that the values and ambitions of 
law schools are beyond the reach of regulators, but are “very much within the control of [the] 
law school” (ibid at 705). Arthurs states that: 
the values [that law schools] embrace and [the] way they define their ambitions… will 
determine whom they hire as faculty members and admit as students, what and how they 
teach, the standards they use to measure achievements, and the way they allocate their scarce 
resources. And crucially, it will determine how, if at all, law schools exploit their strategic 
location as producers and distributors, as conservators and critics, of legal and social knowledge 
(Ibid at 705-706). 
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of scholarship, including empirical, theoretical, and experiential accounts. These 
accounts indicate, for example, that despite efforts to make legal education and 
the profession more representative, minorities continue to be statistically under-
represented9 and often recount experiences of marginalization in law school.10 
Moving from the descriptive to the prescriptive, in Part IV of this article I 
outline the parameters for a pedagogical program of diversity in legal education. 
I redefine the theoretical and normative underpinnings of a diversity pedagogy 
that I describe as “thick,” and argue that the confluence of diversity intensifi-
cation and curriculum reform provides a unique opportunity to implement 
novel, and more inclusive, approaches to legal education. On this basis, Part 
V highlights how the embrace of experiential education, with its blended use 
of hands-on experience and structured critical reflection, can help law schools 
deliver on their commitment to diversity in substantive ways that both produce 
competent lawyers and reduce barriers in education and the profession.
I. WHY DIVERSITY?
There is wide agreement that diversity in North American legal education 
is a priority. The promotion of diversity is desirable for various reasons. The 
Canadian Bar Association spearheaded research and policy work on sex and racial 
equality, publishing two key reports in 1993 and 1999 that called for greater 
9. See Michael Ornstein, Racialization and Gender of Lawyers in Ontario: A Report for the 
Law Society of Upper Canada (Toronto: LSUC, April 2010), online: <http://www.lsuc.
on.ca/media/convapril10_ornstein.pdf>. See also Wendy Cukier et al, DiverseCity Counts 
3: A Snapshot of Diverse Leadership in the GTA (Toronto: Diversity Institute, Ted Rogers 
School of Management at Ryerson University, 2011), online: <http://diversecitytoronto.ca/
wp-content/uploads/CountsReport3-full.pdf>. Cukier et al examine racial representation in 
positions of leadership within the various institutions of the legal community of the Greater 
Toronto region. The trends identified in their report are likely representative of many North 
American cities with similar diversity patterns. In the United States, while 70 per cent of 
the general population is white, about 90 per cent of lawyers are white. The American legal 
profession is less racially diverse than most other professions—racial diversity in the legal 
profession has actually slowed considerably since 1995. See ABA Presidential Initiative 
Commission on Diversity, Diversity in the Legal Profession: The Next Steps (Chicago: American 
Bar Association, 2011) at 11-13, online: <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/diversity/next_steps_2011.authcheckdam.pdf> [ABA, Next Steps].
10. See Brenna Bhandar, “Always on the Defence: The Myth of Universality and the Persistence 
of Privilege in Legal Education” (2002) 14:2 CJWL 341; Diana Younes, “Teaching White: 
Constructing Lawyer Identity in Canadian Law Schools” in RJ Gilmour et al, ed, “Too 
Asian?” Racism, Privilege, and Post-Secondary Education (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2012). 
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attention to diversity in the Canadian legal profession.11 A survey of Canadian 
law society websites reveals that all of the provincial and territorial regulatory 
bodies have adopted some form of diversity policy, linking the core values of the 
legal profession with the practical goals of increasing representation, equality, 
and access in legal practice and services.12 For example, the Law Society of Upper 
Canada (LSUC), which regulates the practice of law in Ontario, maintains a rich 
array of programs and initiatives designed to promote “equity and diversity.” This 
includes a Discrimination and Harassment Counsel and a membership-based 
Equity Advisory Group attached to a committee of benchers (elected governors). 
In 2012, the LSUC created the Challenges Faced by Racialized Licensees 
11. Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession, Touchstones for Change: Equality, 
Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1993) (Chair: The Hon 
Bertha Wilson), online: <http://www.cba.org/CBA/equity/pdf/touchstonesforchange.pdf> 
[CBA, Touchstones]; Working Group on Racial Equality in the Legal Profession, Racial 
Equality in the Legal Profession (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1999) (Co-Chairs: 
Joanne St Louis & Benjamin Trevino, QC), online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/pubs/pdf/
racialequality.pdf>.
12. Survey conducted by the author (May 2013) [on file with author]. See e.g. Law Society 
of British Columbia, Equity and Diversity, online: <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.
cfm?cid=5&t=Equity-and-Diversity>; Law Society of British Columbia, Code of Professional 
Conduct for British Columbia (2013) ch 2, 6.3; The Law Society of Alberta, Rules of the Law 
Society of Alberta (2013) at 1-15; The Law Society of Alberta, Strategic Plan 2010-2013 
(November 2010) at 3-4, 8, online: <http://www.lawsociety.ab.ca/files/management/
strategic_plan.pdf>; Law Society of Saskatchewan, Equity Office (2011), online: <http://www.
lawsociety.sk.ca/for-lawyers-and-students/equity-office.aspx>; Law Society of Saskatchewan, 
Code of Professional Conduct (2012) at 104; Law Society of Manitoba, About Equity 
(2008-2014), online: <http://www.lawsociety.mb.ca/equity/about-equity>; Law Society of 
Manitoba, Code of Professional Conduct (2011) rr 5.03(4)-(5); Law Society of Upper Canada, 
Equity and Diversity in the Legal Profession (2014), online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.
aspx?id=2147487011>; Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct (2000) 
rr 6.3.1 [LSUC, Rules]; Law Society of New Brunswick, Code of Professional Conduct (2009) 
at 93; Law Society of New Brunswick, History at b, online: < http://lawsociety-barreau.
nb.ca/en/about/history>; Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, The Equity Program (2014), 
online: <http://www.nsbs.org/improving_justice/the_equity_program>; Legal Profession 
Act, SNS 2004, c 28, s 4(2)(d)(i); Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society Code of Professional Conduct 
(2012) at 89; Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, Annual Report 2012, online: <http://nsbs.org/
sites/default/files/cms/publications/annual-reports/nsbsannrpt2012.pdf>; Canadian Bar 
Association, Code of Professional Conduct (1974), ch XX, no 6, adopted by the Law Society of 
Prince Edward Island, online: <http://www.lspei.pe.ca/pdf/code_of_professional_conduct_
CBA1987.pdf>; Law Society of Newfoundland and Labrador, Code of Professional Conduct 
(2013) at 91, 101; Law Society of Yukon, Toward a New Legal Profession Act: Policy Paper (18 
November 2011) at 4; Law Society of the Northwest Territories, Policy Manual (1980) at 
16; Law Society of Nunavut, Legal Ethics and Practice Committee, online: <http://lawsociety.
nu.ca/legal-ethics-and-practice-committee>.
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Working Group with a mandate to investigate obstacles to minorities in the 
profession and consider strategies for enhanced inclusion at all career stages.13 
The LSUC also maintains a Disability Resource Centre, a Career Coaching for 
Women Lawyers program, a Retention of Women in Private Practice working 
group, and a Human Rights Monitoring Group. The American Bar Association’s 
report, Next Steps, suggests that a similar embrace of diversity and equity has 
occurred across the American legal profession.14 
In addition to the institutional and professional recognition of the priority 
of diversity, law faculties have also noted the diversity gaps in legal education, 
and have taken clear steps to redress historical exclusion.15 A survey of seventeen 
Canadian law faculty websites finds that diversity is explicitly mentioned in the 
governing policies of eleven schools.16 Of the faculties that do not have an explicit 
13. Equity and Aboriginal Issues Committee, Report to Convocation (Toronto: Law Society of 
Upper Canada, 2012). 
14. Supra note 9.
15. See Kevin R Johnson, “The Importance of Student and Faculty Diversity in Law Schools: 
One Dean’s Perspective” (2011) 96:5 Iowa L Rev 1549 (outlining the arguments, from a 
Dean’s perspective, for improving diversity of both the student body and faculty in legal 
education). 
16. There are seventeen Canadian law faculties outside of Quebec. I did not include the five 
Quebec law schools in this study. Survey conducted by the author (May 2013) [on file 
with author]. Several law faculties explicitly refer to diversity in website materials. See e.g. 
University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, Equity Resources (2014), online: <http://
www.law.ubc.ca/equity-resources> (“The Faculty celebrates, supports and promotes the 
importance of diversity, and equality to a vibrant law school”); University of Victoria 
Faculty of Law Equity Policy (2008), online: <http://www.uvic.ca/law/assets/docs/
studentandacademicmatterspagedocs/universityofvictoriafacultyoflawequitypolicy.pdf> 
(“Diversity, equity, fairness and respect are paramount values at the Faculty of Law and 
central to this policy” at 2); Philip Bryden, “Dean’s Welcome,” University of Alberta Faculty 
of Law, online: <http://lawschool.ualberta.ca/about/welcome> (“Our students are a diverse 
group”); University of Manitoba, “Support,” Robson Hall, Faculty of Law (2014), online: 
<http://law.robsonhall.ca/support> (“Robson Hall promotes diversity.”); University of 
Toronto Faculty of Law, Admissions Policies (2014), online: <http://www.law.utoronto.ca/
admissions/jd-admissions/admissions-policies> (“The Faculty seeks a diverse … student 
body.”); Queen’s University Faculty of Law, Admission Philosophy and Criteria (2011-2012), 
online: <http://www.queensu.ca/calendars/law/Admission_Philosophy_and_Criteria.html> 
(declaring that the “diversity of the Canadian population should be reflected in the ranks of 
those granted access to legal education”); Queen’s University, JD Admissions (2014), online: 
<http://law.queensu.ca/jd-admissions/admission-information/first-year> (access category 
describing commitment to enhancing diversity in legal education and the legal profession); 
Osgoode Hall Law School, Our Holistic Review Process (2014), online: <http://www.
osgoode.yorku.ca/prospective-students/jd-program/jd-admissions/review-process/holistic-
admission-policy> (“Our admission policy recognizes, fosters and celebrates excellence and 
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diversity policy, the goals of diversity are reflected in institutional practices. 
Examples include targeted equitable admissions policies, especially for Aboriginal 
applicants, and “equity” policies for increasing the participation of “racial and 
cultural minorities, Aboriginal peoples, lesbians, gay men and bisexuals, persons 
with disabilities, and economically disadvantaged persons.”17 These initiatives 
ascribe value to the experiences of “difference” carried by members of marginal-
ized groups and minorities. Through policies and practices rooted in equality 
equity… . We place a priority on opening doors to communities that traditionally have been 
under-represented in the legal profession”); Western Law, First-Year Applications (2014), 
online: <https://www.law.uwo.ca/admissions/first_year_admissions.html> (“The Faculty 
of Law is strongly committed to excellence and diversity”); Windsor Law, Our Admissions 
Criteria, online: <http://www.uwindsor.ca/law/343/our-admissions-criteria> (seeking “those 
who have traditionally been barred from higher law study to ensure that Canada’s many 
communities will have access to legal professionals, as that [sic] Canada’s diverse and varied 
society can be served from a variety of perspectives”); McGill Faculty of Law, Event, “‘Law 
school and diversity’: Admission information session for students of colour and students 
from marginalized backgrounds” (12 October 2012), online: <http://www.mcgill.ca/law/
channels/event/law-school-and-diversity-admission-information-session-students-colour-
and-students-m>; University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law, Law Admissions Handbook 
2014-2015 at 4, 5, 6, 16-17. See also University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, Common 
Law Section, “Education Equity,” Prospective Students, online: <http://www.commonlaw.
uottawa.ca/en>; Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University, Indigenous Blacks & 
Mi’kmaq Initiative, online: <http://www.dal.ca/faculty/law/about/indigenous-blacks-mi-
kmaq-initiative.html>; Lee Stuesser, “Dean’s Message,” Lakehead University Faculty of Law, 
online: <https://www.lakeheadu.ca/academics/departments/law/deans-message>; Université 
de Moncton, Objectifs, online: <http://www.umoncton.ca/umcm-droit/node/3>; University 
of Calgary Faculty of Law, Aboriginal Applicants to the JD Program, online: <http://www.law.
ucalgary.ca/prospectivestudents/admission/aboriginalapplicants>; University of Saskatchewan 
College of Law, Special Applicants, online: <http://law.usask.ca/programs/law-degree/special-
applicants.php>; Thompson Rivers University Faculty of Law, Academic Accommodation 
Policy, online: <https://www.tru.ca/__shared/assets/Law_Academic_Accommodation_
Policy25672.pdf>.
17. University of Ottawa, Education Equity Office (15 December 2009), online: <http://www.
commonlaw.uottawa.ca>. 
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commitments, law schools across North America have universally pledged to 
make the promotion of diversity in legal education a priority.18
The rationale for embracing diversity has not always been articulated in 
terms of equality. The most common rationales for diversity come from three 
distinct approaches. First, individual, group, corporate, and institutional forces 
drive the impetus for diversity within the legal profession.19 This impetus reflects 
clients’ increasing expectation for their lawyers and law firms to demonstrate 
diversity competence. This expectation arises as a result of factors of globaliza-
tion, particularly transnational trade and migration. Lawyers with cultural and 
linguistic proficiencies, and firms with diverse staff, are better able to meet diverse 
client needs.20 The professional push towards diversity also recognizes the fact 
that lawyers are leaders in many fields and have a broad mandate to promote the 
interests of justice. The profession takes seriously its monopoly over the provision 
of legal services and recognizes that this privilege comes with concomitant duties. 
The profession claims to hold its members to a high standard of professional 
responsibility and integrity. This standard requires lawyers to be attentive to 
shifting social and demographic forces that are bound to impact their profes-
sional lives and their provision of legal services to the public.
Second, a political imperative recognizes that diversity is a priority in public 
policy, is modelled within the public service sector, and is promoted in the 
broader society through a host of initiatives designed to enhance communica-
tions and interactions across differences. Lawyers bear considerable responsibility 
for sustaining a democratic, rule-of-law legal order that represents the society it 
serves. For much of the general public, lawyers are both the guardians and the 
18. Of the seventeen Canadian law school websites surveyed, eleven explicitly reference 
“diversity” as an institutional priority; the remaining six faculties have policies and priorities 
that do not contain the word diversity, but instead emphasize “equity” or “access.” See 
e.g. Lorne Sossin, “Transparency and Accountability Reflected in Tracking of Osgoode’s 
Student Body” (29 May 2013), online: <http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/prospective-students/
jd-program/life-osgoode/transparency-accountability-reflected-tracking-osgoodes-student-
body> (summarizing statistics that show the 2015 class of JD students is “the most diverse 
in Osgoode’s history” and linking these data to the school’s goals of “accessibility and 
inclusion”); University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, Equity Resources, online: <http://
www.law.ubc.ca/equity-resources> (“The Faculty celebrates, supports and promotes the 
importance of diversity [and] equity”); University of Toronto Faculty of Law, Public Interest 
and Diversity, online: <http://www.law.utoronto.ca/focus-area/public-interest-and-diversity> 
(noting the “school’s … commitment to diversity”).
19. See e.g. Ryerson General Counsel’s Office, Legal Leaders for Diversity: A Statement of Support 
for Diversity and Inclusion by General Counsel in Canada (June 2011), online: <http://www.
computershop.ryerson.ca/about/generalcounsel>.
20. See ABA, Next Steps, supra note 9 at 5.
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gatekeepers of the legal system, instrumental in the vindication of citizens’ legal 
rights and entitlements. As leaders in both politics and society, members of the 
legal profession should ensure broad and representative access to the profession 
as a gateway to positions of influence in politics and society.21 
Finally, the growing importance of ethics regulation has led the diversity 
imperative to be linked with legal professionalism and access to justice. Emerging 
scholarship on Canadian legal ethics highlights the importance of diversity to the 
legitimacy of the legal profession and the administration of justice.22 This view 
holds that a legal profession that is not appropriately representative of the society 
in which it operates will be hindered in carrying out its core mandate and will 
lose the confidence of the public it is bound to serve. The ethics push has also 
been linked to more substantive notions of justice, and to the suggestion that 
lawyers have a professional duty to promote justice and equality.23 While such 
language is articulated in formal policy, there is little elaboration or enforcement. 
Indeed, constitutional and legislative developments in recent decades 
have focused more clearly on the public role of lawyers in remedying historical 
disadvantage and promoting equality as a social goal.24 In turn, this focus has 
produced a normative imperative to promote diversity in the legal profession 
and, by necessity, in legal education. In Ontario, the Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“Rules”) require lawyers to fulfil a “special responsibility to respect the require-
ments of human rights laws in force in Ontario and, specifically, to honour the 
obligation not to discriminate”25 on the grounds listed in the Human Rights 
Code (“Code”).26 Ontario is the only jurisdiction that makes this human rights 
responsibility an explicit rule of practice. Five other provincial codes of conduct 
21. See Cukier et al, supra note 9 (concluding that “the generally low rates of visible minority 
representation among legal sector leaders suggest that the legal profession and its institutions 
need to continue to promote the advancement of visible minorities in leadership roles” at 
34-35).
22. See Adam M Dodek, “Canadian Legal Ethics: Ready for the Twenty-First Century at Last” 
(2008) 10:7 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 [Dodek, “Ready for the Twenty-First Century”].
23. See David M Tanovich “Law’s Ambition and the Reconstruction of Role Morality in 
Canada” (2005) 28:2 Dal LJ 267 [Tanovich, “Law’s Ambition”] (arguing for a professional 
code of conduct that incorporates moral concepts of justice and equality, and presumably 
including diversity).
24. In Canada, these developments include the adoption of statutory human rights, the 
Canadian Bill of Rights, and, in 1982, the incorporation into the constitution of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
25. LSUC, Rules, supra note 12, r 6.3.1
26. Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19 [Code]. 
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include—in commentary—reference to a “special responsibility” to either 
“comply with,” “respect,” or “honour” the obligations in human rights law,27 
while all three territories and two provinces include simply a “responsibility” to 
do so.28 Only the professional codes of Quebec and New Brunswick make no 
mention of human rights law. 
Tethering the lawyer’s duty to promote equality to the individual right to 
non-discrimination limits the aspiration of an equality promotion ethic. It also 
raises the obvious question, why include the rule at all if it requires nothing more 
than what statutory human rights already require of lawyers? In the absence of 
articulated applications, whether as rules or standards, it is difficult to see how 
a broader equality goal is to become manifest. It is more likely that the existing 
professional culture reproduces itself—a professionalism absorbed in privilege 
and driven by profit. Whether law teachers can (and should) seek, through 
progressive destabilizing pedagogy, to effect systemic change, economic justice, 
or the dismantling of hierarchy, remains unclear. It is no wonder, then, that in the 
absence of a coherent theory of equality to define the goal of promoting diversity, 
that goal ends up appearing either thin or coopted by vested interests. 
Despite the prevalence of factors beyond the control of law teachers and 
academic administrators, if the goal is to promote diversity in the legal profession, 
there are good reasons to focus efforts on the law school. The law school is the 
first point of admission to the legal community. It is the site of immersion and 
instruction in legal reasoning, and the gateway to the profession. It is where one 
assimilates legal theory and doctrine, acquires aptitude, learns and engages in the 
production of legal knowledge, develops an idea about what a lawyer is, identifies 
professional options, and pursues job opportunities or prepares for solo practice. 
In fact, a great deal happens in law school that is both reflective of the world 
in which lawyers work, and determinative of how that world will look in the 
future. The first women and minority law professors wrote of their experiences 
27. These are: British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Newfoundland & 
Labrador. See supra note 12.
28. These are: Nunavut, Northwest Territories, Yukon, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia. 
See supra note 12.
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of alienation in the classroom, on faculty councils, and in the law books.29 They 
wrote about the differential impact of law and legal education on individuals and 
groups in ways that speak more deeply to underlying systemic inequality than do 
formal anti-discrimination laws. Their subjective experiences of legal education 
and professional initiation exposed realities that created an imperative for reform. 
For at least the past thirty years, North American law faculties have articulated 
a commitment to making law schools more representative of the societies they 
serve; but their efforts have failed to extinguish the diversity deficit, and student 
accounts of alienation in the classroom and in student life suggest that the work 
of diversity is far from complete. As I have suggested, a significant contributor to 
the problem of strategizing the promotion of diversity and evaluating its success 
is that the concept itself has not been adequately defined. And, more importantly, 
the implications of how diversity is defined have not been seriously considered.
II. DIVERSITY AS EQUALITY
As a descriptive concept, diversity is a statement of demographic data. Framed 
most broadly, it refers to the wide range of individuals and groups that constitute 
a society. It may refer to all sorts of grounds of difference, including not only 
the types of grounds protected by anti-discrimination legislation, but any basis 
of difference. The potential for definitional indeterminacy has led to some 
concern about a concept of diversity devoid of substance.30 For some, “diversity” 
can be understood simply as a synonym for “variety.”31 But what is the value 
of celebrating difference for its own sake? No doubt, there may be aesthetic or 
other reasons to value difference, but this is not how diversity is conceptual-
ized in public discourse, at least with respect to the legal profession. Rather, 
the diversity imperative emerged as a purposeful response to institutionalized 
historical exclusion.
29. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education” 
(1989-1990) 11:1 Nat’l Black LJ 1 [Crenshaw, “Race-Conscious Pedagogy”]; Patricia J 
Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1991) at 5, 10, 56; Mari Matsuda, “Affirmative Action and Legal 
Knowledge: Planting Seeds in PlowedUp Ground” (Spring 1988) 11:1 Harv Women’s LJ 
1 [Matsuda, “Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge”]. See also Tina Grillo, “Tenure and 
Minority Women Law Professors: Separating the Strands” (1996-1997) 31:4 USF L Rev 747 
(noting the patterns of exclusion within law school faculty composition at 747-48).
30. Sheila Foster, “Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of Diversity” 
(1993) Wis L Rev 105 at 133.
31. Ibid at 126.
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A diversity program aimed at remedying historical exclusion would strip back 
layers of historical understandings of the law and lawyering in order to expose 
the foundations of exclusion. This normative transformation, if undertaken in 
legal education, would have necessary implications. It would demand a critical 
assessment of what it means to “think like a lawyer,” because it would challenge 
the inherited professional model and, necessarily, the skills and traits that charac-
terize the “good” lawyer.32 Recognizing that lawyers have a privilege that requires 
them to embed responsibility in their professional culture is one reason legal 
regulators enforce rules of professional conduct. However, embedding the culture 
of professional responsibility begins not with admission to the bar and to profes-
sional regulation, but with education. Law teachers are in a primary position to 
initiate students into legal culture, identity, analysis, and action well before the 
regulator takes on the role of governing professional responsibility. The question 
remains whether legal educators will challenge and reform inherited approaches 
to legal professionalism or simply replicate them. A diversity pedagogy requires 
the former if it is to meaningfully deliver on the stated normative commitments.
The premises on which legal reasoning is based present the key challenge 
for teaching law from a diversity-as-equality perspective. Principal among these 
premises is the posture of neutrality or objectivity in law. Writing as a black 
woman teaching in an American law faculty in the 1990s, Kimberlé Crenshaw 
identified a governing myth in traditional legal education, “perspectivelessness,”33 
which is described as a myopic posture that obscures or ignores patterns of 
inequality and the complicity of the law, legal institutions, and the legal academy 
in perpetuating structural racial inequality.34 The harm of perspectivelessness is 
that it speaks a ‘truth’ about law’s neutrality that is plainly untrue for members of 
disadvantaged communities. The ways in which perspectivelessness masks law’s 
32. See Tanovich, “Law’s Ambition,” supra note 23; Trevor CW Farrow, “The Good, the Right, 
and the Lawyer” (Osgoode Hall Law School Comparative Research in Law & Political 
Economy Research Paper No 8/2013), online: <http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/
clpe/257>; David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1988) (arguing that, for all intents and purposes, lawyers are “the law” for 
the vast majority of the public and for this reason, being a good lawyer and an ethical lawyer 
is important for the entire justice system). 
33. “Race-Conscious Pedagogy,” supra note 29 at 2-3, 6, 10, 12. See also Brenna Bhandar, supra 
note 10.
34. There is a sufficient body of work now to accept as sound and persuasive the notion 
of a broadly shared experience of racial antagonism and exclusion stemming from the 
conventional ways in which the law is created, reproduced, interpreted, applied, and taught. 
See generally, Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 2d ed 
(New York: NYU Press, 2012); Crenshaw, “Race-Conscious Pedagogy,” supra note 29. 
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complicity in reproducing racial exclusion are muted by the law’s embrace of 
formal equality.35 Indeed, the very idea of a perspectiveless, ‘neutral’ law is born of 
the concept of formal equality. Colour-blindness is a classic example of a formal 
equality mindset.36 Under such models, equal treatment is ensured through 
‘objective’ decision-making and by treating everybody the same. 
Formal equality accepts the moral view that all persons are, at least theoreti-
cally, equally capable of realizing or fulfilling any goal reasonably available to any 
other person. However, it fails to appreciate historical factors that frustrate the 
possibility of actual equality of opportunity. Formal equality fails to account for 
the underlying conditions that create exclusion in the first place. It is not useful 
to teach law from an internal, false-neutral perspective. Rather, law teachers are 
increasingly realizing that effective legal education must be self-revealing about 
the different narratives supporting law’s meaning and impact. 
The embrace of legal pluralism as a tool for understanding overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting normative systems helps confront the pressures of diversity. 
A pluralist understanding of law seeks to achieve 
detachment from legal centralism revolving around state law, criticism of the ex-
clusiveness of state law, decentralization of court-centered judicial studies, explora-
tion of non-state legal orders, unveiling of informal socio-legal practices, and an 
understanding of law as a multi-centered field that deals with the convergence of a 
multiplicity of norms, localities, states, global sites, and practices.37 
Because society is increasingly differentiated and the application of universal 
norms is practically fraught, social-fact pluralism (i.e., descriptive pluralism) 
describes the realities of the multicultural, globalizing societies in which North 
American law schools are operating.38 However, even normative pluralism (i.e., 
pluralism as a normative goal) “will [not] on its own provide … direct guidance 
on normative questions.”39 For this reason, if diversity is a manifestation of 
35. The concept of substantive equality is favoured by many who take a broader view of 
the original causes and enabling constructs that lead to the persistence of systemic 
discrimination. Formal equality remains a dominant, and even resurgent, model of 
conceiving of equality. See Mario L Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, “A Post-Race 
Equal Protection?” (2010) 98:4 Geo LJ 967 (warning against the perils of a “post-race” or 
race-neutral analysis of American legal history or contemporary realities, given statistical 
evidence showing parallels between race and social and economic disadvantage at 968).
36. Judith G Greenberg, “Erasing Race from Legal Education” (1994) 28:1 U Mich JL Ref 51.
37. Gad Barzilai, “Beyond Relativism: Where Is Political Power in Legal Pluralism?” (2008) 9:2 
Theor Inq L 395 at 396.
38. See William Twining, “Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective” (2010) 20:3 
Duke J Comp & Int’l L 473.
39. Ibid at 517.
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social-fact pluralism, it still requires a normative corollary. This article asserts 
that, within the diversity pedagogy model, substantive equality is the value that 
provides the normative content. 
Equality as a diversity norm in legal education must do two things. First, 
it must embrace normative pluralism. That is, it must accept that no one 
perspective or system of positive law has dominion over ‘truth.’ And, for this 
reason, the second thing equality as a diversity norm must do is to reject the 
idea of “perspectivelessness” as a normative frame or default position in legal 
instruction. False notions of ‘neutral’ or disinvested legal analysis rest on an 
internalized, constructed, and self-referential concept of ‘objectivity’ that distorts 
reality by employing established perspectives to the exclusion of others. The 
privileging of tradition occurs by holding to the idea that legal analysis can be 
taught as a fixed, objective ‘science’ without directly engaging with changes or 
conflicts of individual values, experiences, and world views. Thus, subverting the 
notion of objectivity or neutrality in legal analysis is a necessary precondition to 
promoting diversity-as-equality in education and creating space for the law to 
embody the full panoply of human experience.
Speaking about diversity in terms of inclusion and exclusion helps emphasize 
important historical connections between power, privilege, and profession-
alism. It also acknowledges gendered and racialized patterns of exclusion. When 
viewed in this full light, the distinction between grounds of difference (what I 
call the “variety approach”) and patterns of exclusion (the “diversity approach”) 
becomes critically important. The promotion of diversity without a willingness to 
investigate and expose the sources of exclusion and to commit to change would 
be meaningless and even counter-productive, given the social fact of inequality. 
Thus, a variety approach, which pursues the goal of representation, only goes part 
way. Diversity from an equality frame of reference moves beyond representation 
and pursues the more meaningful goal of inclusion. In Part II(A-B), below, I 
outline how the dual components of representation and inclusion are integral to 
a substantively meaningful concept of diversity.
A. REPRESENTATION
Although there is no universal definition of diversity, it is widely accepted that 
the legal profession should be representative of the significant personal and 
group differences that constitute the broader society. This norm of “representa-
tion” looks to the social makeup of a particular jurisdiction and asks whether 
there is a rough correlation between the demographic composition of society 
and that of the constituent members of the legal profession. So, for example, 
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if Aboriginal peoples constitute 2 per cent of Ontario’s population but only 1 
per cent of lawyers in that province,40 then we have a representation deficit of 
Aboriginal lawyers in Ontario. The reason why a representation gap is viewed as 
a problem is because the foundational arrangements of liberal democracy provide 
assurances, at minimum, that all citizens have equal access to the same opportu-
nities as everyone else. Equal opportunity is the baseline of the representation 
rationale. A representation gap is evidence that this basic assurance of equality is 
malfunctioning.41 Within this logic, the onus rests with the legal academy and 
profession, if they fail to draw broadly from different sectors of the society, to 
remedy the sources of exclusion and mitigate their effects. 
The equality interest in promoting diversity has gained relevance as a result 
of demographic changes in recent decades that have radically altered the North 
American population. In Ontario, for example, by the mid-2000s “visible 
minorities”42 constituted more than 20 per cent of the population and growing; 
in the city of Toronto, they were nearly half the population.43 In a report 
prepared for the LSUC, Michael Ornstein finds that between 2001 and 2006, 
the proportion of non-white lawyers rose from 9 per cent to 11.5 per cent—
well below their demographic representation in Ontario.44 Among younger 
lawyers (aged 25–34), the proportion of non-white lawyers (20 per cent) in 2006 
was on a par with their provincial population figure.45 On the whole, the legal 
profession appears to be on track to be statistically representative in the near 
40. These figures are current to 2006. See Ornstein, supra note 9 at 2-4.
41. It is beyond the scope of this article to trace, empirically, the sources of under-representation. 
However, law schools committed to promoting diversity can be said, even on a crude reading 
of the evidence, to inherit and reproduce exclusionary patterns of race and class privileging, 
despite promises of inclusion. 
42. Statistics Canada adopts the Employment Equity definition of “visible minority,” as “persons, 
other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.” The 
following groups are listed as primary examples of visible minority communities in Canada: 
“Chinese, South Asian, Black, Arab, West Asian, Filipino, Southeast Asian, Latin American, 
Japanese, and Korean.” See Statistics Canada, Visible Minority Person (18 December 2012), 
online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo53c-eng.htm>.
43. According to the 2006 Canadian Census, Ontario, a province of roughly 12 million 
residents, had a population of 2.7 million “visible minorities,” constituting 22.5% of the 
population. In Toronto, a city of 5 million, visible minorities numbered 2.1 million, or 
42% of the city’s population. See Statistics Canada, Visible minority population, by census 
metropolitan areas (2006 Census): (Kingston, Peterborough, Oshawa, Toronto, Hamilton) (6 
November 2009), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/
demo53c-eng.htm>. 
44. Ornstein, supra note 9 at i.
45. Ibid.
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future. Nonetheless, there remain significant representation gaps when the data 
are examined more closely. For example, Ornstein found that when looking at 
minority groups in Ontario, there were ratios of around 1 lawyer in 627, 750, 
and 755 for members of the South Asian, Black, and Chinese communities, 
respectively.46 In contrast, Ornstein found “just one Filipino lawyer for every 
2,730 members of that community, one for every 1,649 Latin Americans, and 
one for every 994 Southeast Asians.”47 Apparently, as old representation deficits 
are narrowed, new ones form and widen.
It is worth observing that the legal profession has always had a represen-
tation deficit.48 Explicit exclusionary norms operated for generations. Such 
norms became untenable in the face of rapid demographic changes, globaliza-
tion, and large-scale transnational migration. These and other factors motivated 
social and legal changes beginning in the 1960s,49 as part of the global “rights 
revolution.”50 The 1960s saw Canada’s first attempts at incorporating a national 
rights instrument, the Canadian Bill of Rights,51 as well as provincial civil rights 
statutes.52 The adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms53 in 1982 
created a clear constitutional mandate to promote a vision of the country based 
on the goal of social inclusion. This was reflected in the Charter’s commitment to 
the “preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians”54 
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid at ii.
48. Constance Backhouse, “Gender and Race in the Construction of ‘Legal Professionalism’: 
Historical Perspectives” (Paper delivered at the First Colloquium on the Legal Profession, 
October 2003), online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/constance_backhouse_gender_and_
race.pdf>; Fiona Kay, “Crossroads to Innovation and Diversity: The Careers of Women 
Lawyers in Quebec” (2001-2002) 47:4 McGill LJ 699. 
49. The American civil rights movement of the 1960s dovetailed with the global movement 
to give life to universal human rights. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 
217(III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810, (1948) 71.
50. See Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative 
Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998) (examining the growth of civil rights 
and human rights across the world, and noting a democratization of access to the courts 
through social activism). 
51. SC 1960, c 44. 
52. See e.g. Code, supra note 26 (first enacted in June 1962). See also Ontario Human Rights 
Commission, Human Rights: The Next Generation (Annual Report of the Ontario Human 
Rights Commission, 2011-2012).
53. Supra note 24.
54. Ibid, s 27. See also Joseph Eliot Magnet, “Multiculturalism and Collective Rights” (2005) 
27:1 Sup Ct L Rev 431 at 441.
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and its entrenchment of an individual right to equality, paired with a shield for 
government-initiated affirmative action for disadvantaged groups.55 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s first judgment interpreting section 15 
equality rights involved a claim by a white South African corporate lawyer 
seeking access to the profession in British Columbia.56 In rejecting the 
citizenship requirement for admission to the bar, the Court affirmed that 
principles of equality would govern the legal profession. Describing the public 
importance of lawyers and the power wielded though the licence to practice, 
Justice McIntyre stated:
While it may be arguable whether the lawyer exercises a judicial, quasi-judicial, or 
governmental role, it is clear that at his own discretion he can invoke the full force 
and authority of the State in procuring and enforcing judgments or other remedial 
measures which may be obtained. It is equally true that in defending an action he 
has the burden of protecting his client from the imposition of such state authority 
and power. By any standard, these powers and duties are vital to the maintenance 
of order in our society and the due administration of the law in the interest of the 
whole community.57
Understanding the essential role of the lawyer in the administration of justice 
in the public interest in the Charter era makes the diversity imperative more than 
a matter of lawyer regulation and professional competence. It is now a function 
of constitutional commitments to equality. 
B. INCLUSION
Closing the representation gap is just one component of promoting a conception 
of diversity that is grounded in equality. Demographics alone are not what 
generated the history of exclusion. In Canada, for example, the history of exclusion 
has been traced to an elitist conception of the legal profession.58 One hundred 
years ago, it was widely accepted that common law lawyers should be white, male, 
Protestant, and English.59 The concept of legal professionalism, modelled on the 
English ‘gentleman,’ was the standard used to define the behaviours and habits 
of a good lawyer. In its effect, this standard operated to exclude non-English, 
non-elites, and women from the legal profession.
55. Charter, supra note 24, ss 15(1)-(2), 27.
56. Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 27 DLR (4th) 600.
57. Ibid at 188.
58. Annie Rochette & Wesley Pue, “Back to Basics?: University Legal Education and 21st 
Century Professionalism” (2001) 20:1 Windsor YB Access Just 167. See also Backhouse, 
supra note 48.
59. Ibid at 3.
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With time, the profession evolved, barriers lowered, and diversity inroads 
gradually brought colour and gender representation to the profession.60 Evolving 
public attitudes about equality and discrimination helped to lower barriers and 
narrow the representation gap, as more women and minorities gained access to 
the profession.61 However, rapidly changing demographics would have an even 
stronger widening effect on the representation gap. In other words, as elitist, 
racist, and sexist ideas that had perpetuated exclusion receded, thereby generating 
openness to increasing racial and gender representation in the profession, the 
demographic diversification of the general population far outpaced the entry 
of minorities into law school and the profession.62 The problem of exclusion—
historically linked to systemic and institutional bigotry and prejudice—was 
heightened by rapid demographic changes.63 What measures were adopted to 
remedy historical exclusion were not sufficient to keep up with the pace of social 
diversification.64 
A flurry of critical race and feminist scholarship beginning in the 1980s 
illustrated the link between exclusion and inequality,65 highlighting the experiences 
60. See Ornstein, supra note 9 at i (observing ethnic diversity among younger lawyers (aged 
25-34) to be on a par with their provincial population figures). However, compared to 
other professions, the legal profession has been notably slow at diversifying and remains 
significantly outpaced by virtually every other regulated profession in that respect (ibid at ii).
61. Ibid at 6-7, 18-20.
62. Ibid at 8 (noting that, as of 2006, “11.5 percent of Ontario lawyers were members of a visible 
minority group, compared to … 23.0 percent of the Ontario population”).
63. By the 1990s, the Canadian legal profession acknowledged the need to address the problem of 
ethnic under-representation. See The Law Society of Upper Canada, Canadian Bar Association 
Report and Recommendations on ‘Racial Equality in the Legal Profession’ (Toronto: Law Society 
of Upper Canada), online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/cbaresponse.pdf> (“A detailing of 
challenges, barriers and opportunities for change, the report provides a unique look into the 
issues of racial discrimination in terms of entry to and activity within the practice of law, and 
various models promoting racial equality within the legal profession” at 1).
64. See Ornstein, supra note 9. 
65. Critical scholarship emerged out of the law and society movement of the late 1960s. Critical 
race and feminist scholarship blossomed in the 1980s. For a survey of the origins of the law 
and society movement, see Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling, “From Legal Realism to Law and 
Society: Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the Social Activist State” (1998) 32:2 Law & 
Soc’y Rev 409.
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of women and people of colour in legal education.66 According to these critics, 
exclusionary historical forces did not evaporate, notwithstanding the narrowing 
of the representation gap brought about by diversity-inspired admissions 
policies.67 For the critics, historical exclusionary practices are embedded in the 
content, modes, and forms of contemporary legal education. Although student 
and faculty composition have evolved, law schools continue to teach according 
to a standard of “whiteness” that, for many, perpetuates a generalized experience 
of alienation from law.68 
Although law teachers may not necessarily intend to perpetuate exclusion,69 
and often aspire to laudable goals,70 critics argue that inherited pedagogical 
methods and expectations, norms of legal reasoning, and standards for 
evaluating “merit”71 have the effect of perpetuating a tradition and practice of 
66. Kimberlé Crenshaw et al, eds, Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Informed the 
Movement (New York: The New Press, 1995); Derrick Bell, “The Final Report: Harvard’s 
Affirmative Action Allegory” (1989) 87:8 Mich L Rev 2382; Williams, supra note 29 at 1; 
Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Anti-Discrimination Law” (1988) 101:7 Harv L Rev 1331; Mari J Matsuda, “Looking to the 
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations” (1987) 22:2 Harv CR-CLL Rev 323.
67. See e.g. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, “‘To Give Them Countenance’: The Case for a Women’s 
Law School” (1999) 22:1 Harv Women’s LJ 1; Valerie Fontaine, “Progress Report: Women 
and People of Color in Legal Education and the Legal Profession” (1995) 6:1 Hastings 
Women’s LJ 27.
68. Margalynne J Armstrong & Stephanie M Wildman, “Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness: 
Transforming Colorblindness to Color Insight” (2008) 86:3 NCL Rev 635. See also Younes, 
supra note 10; Bhandar, supra note 10. 
69. Matsuda, “Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge,” supra note 29 at 11 (arguing that 
legal knowledge is constructed in an exclusionary way to ensure that outsider voices are 
perpetually marginalized).
70. Jonathan Feingold & Doug Souza, “Measuring the Racial Unevenness of Law School” (2013) 
15:1 Afr-Am L & Pol’y 71 (stating that “race-dependent burdens can arise in institutions and 
communities that expressly promote racial diversity and condemn overt racial discrimination; 
good intentions are no panacea to racial unevenness” at 73).
71. Matsuda, “Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge,” supra note 29. See also Daria 
Roithmayr, “Deconstructing the Distinction between Bias and Merit” (1997) 85:5 Cal L 
Rev 1449 (critiquing merit on the basis that law school admission standards necessarily 
embody race-conscious social preferences that existed at the time the standards were 
developed, and which “disproportionately exclude people of color and women because 
the standards historically have been developed by members of dominant groups in ways 
that end up favoring them” at 1452); Kimberly West-Faulcon, “More Intelligent Design: 
Testing Measures of Merit” (2011) 13:5 U Pa J Const L 1235 (referring to social science 
evidence to argue that common law school admissions tests are not good predictors of 
future academic performance and lead to racial distortions based on an unsound theory of 
human intelligence).
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racial exclusion.72 Critics suggest that traditional law school evaluation is hardly 
merit-based and neutral. They argue that ranking methods privilege a white male 
normativity, have differential impacts on non-white, non-male students, and 
perpetuate disadvantage and bias.73 They warn that the postures of ‘neutrality’ or 
‘objectivity’ in the dominant modes of legal analysis and methods of evaluation 
operate to mask the reproduction of racial hierarchy.74
Law faculties have not been oblivious to these concerns and critiques. 
However, past and existing efforts at diversity promotion within law faculties are 
best described as a thin approach to diversity. Law school administrators have 
directed energies at closing the representation gap through equitable admissions 
policies. In so doing, they have failed to undertake the kind of curriculum 
reform needed to make the form and content of legal education a more inclusive 
experience, one that is more directly relevant to the experiences of the diverse 
society that law schools are now expected, and claim, to represent.
III. THE FIRST WAVE OF DIVERSITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION
The first wave of diversity promotion in legal education was characterized by 
two main sites of administrative action: admissions and curricular offerings. 
After surveying each of these sites, I will posit that these measures have served 
an important purpose but offer only partial remedies, providing incomplete 
mitigation of the history of exclusion in legal education. 
A. TARGETED ADMISSIONS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN ACTION
Affirmative action in legal education was designed to increase the ranks of 
minority lawyers in the profession by admitting members of identifiable, 
historically disadvantaged groups.75 Access to an affirmative action program was 
72. See e.g. Crenshaw et al, supra note 66.
73. Richard Delgado, “Rodrigo’s Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action” (1995) 83:4 
Geo LJ 1711 [Delgado, “Rodrigo’s Tenth Chronicle”]. See also Roithmayr, supra note 71; 
West-Faulcon, supra note 71. 
74. Younes, supra note 10; Rob Trousdale, “White Privilege and the Case-Dialogue Method” 
(2010) 1:1 Wm Mitchell L Rev 28 (describing the result of formal race neutrality as “a 
classroom environment that actively encourages the silencing of minority students. Forced 
to stand apart from their own self, minorities are generally more reluctant than their white 
counterparts to speak in the classroom” at 41).
75. Dolores J Blonde et al, “The Impact of Law School Admission Criteria: Evaluating the 
Broad-Based Admission Policy at the University of Windsor Faculty of Law” (1998) 61:2 
Sask L Rev 529 at 533.
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conditioned on membership (usually through self-identification) in a targeted 
group. Targeted admission would typically consist of altering the ‘objective’ 
criteria in admissions standards, while allotting weight to other factors designed 
to ameliorate the strength of minority applicants’ comparative profiles. Although 
individual merit is conventionally the sole overriding criterion for law school 
admission, any unearned advantage conferred by affirmative action to the 
individual by virtue of group membership would be justified on the basis that it 
redresses historical wrongs (whose effects are systemic and ongoing) that affect 
individuals by virtue of their membership in that group. 
When diverse life experiences or perspectives are seen as strengths sufficient to 
bolster or complement more conventional criteria (like undergraduate marks and 
LSAT scores), affirmative action can provide access to law school for individuals 
who might never have successfully applied. More importantly, affirmative action 
programs provide a concrete response to the history of formal and informal 
exclusion. Law schools benefit by being able to demonstrate better representa-
tion, at least formally, which boosts their image and legitimacy. Reversing the 
discrimination allows for more rapid systemic change than would otherwise occur 
in a more ‘neutral’ arrangement over time, and this strategy is more manageable 
than cruder alternatives. 
There was a sense of urgency when the American legal academy began to 
seriously consider race-targeted admissions as the solution to the representation 
deficit, which, at the height of the 1960s American civil rights movement, could 
no longer be ignored. In 1964, black Americans accounted for only about 1 per 
cent of law students and the same proportion of the legal profession. By 2001, 
blacks constituted 7.7 per cent of American first-year law students at American 
Bar Association-accredited schools.76 Though not the only factor, targeted 
admissions were key to increasing black access to law school (especially at elite 
institutions) and, in turn, to jobs in the profession. Later, affirmative action 
would drive an even more dramatic demographic shift to broader diversity by 
including other minority groups, in particular Hispanics, Asian-Americans, and 
Native Americans.77 
The assumption behind affirmative action was that, although representation 
from minority groups would likely increase naturally over time, patience was 
76. Richard H Sander, “A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools” 
(2004) 57:2 Stan L Rev 367 at 374.
77. In 1971, blacks accounted for more than two-thirds of all minorities enrolled in American 
law schools; by 2001, their proportion had dropped to just over one-third of the racialized 
student body. See ibid at 386.
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not an option, both for functional and principled reasons. In the United States, 
with the civil rights struggle directly engaging issues of law and justice, the liberal 
establishment at the helm of legal education had to demonstrate commitment to 
the values of the legal profession at a time of significant political reorientation: 
“Gradualism as a philosophy of racial justice seemed discredited; many of those 
running both private and public institutions felt they had to do something rapid 
and dramatic to demonstrate progress in black access.”78 
Affirmative action was always controversial in the United States, and the issue 
has made its way to the US Supreme Court five times in thirty-five years.79 In its 
1978 decision in Bakke,80 the US Court very cautiously ruled on the constitution-
ality of race as a university admissions factor, outlining permissible parameters. 
Ever since, perhaps out of lawyerly prudence, American law schools have 
observed a “code of silence” on their affirmative action policies: “The relatively 
vibrant research and discussion about affirmative action that characterized the 
late 1960s and 1970s almost totally disappeared in the 1980s and 1990s.”81 As a 
result, it became difficult to track empirically results of specific affirmative action 
programs. In Canada, by contrast, affirmative action received an explicit consti-
tutional shield in section 15 of the 1982 Charter. It is therefore surprising how 
little data has been reported by Canadian law schools operating affirmative action 
programs. A 1999 study of law school admissions across Canada revealed that the 
majority of Canadian law schools “had not conducted any empirical studies or 
reviewed the efficacy of their admissions criteria and policies in any systematic 
way,”82 including “affirmative action, special access, or discretionary admissions 
policies.”83 It appears that little has changed over the last fifteen years, though 
further investigations are certainly warranted.
Notwithstanding the urgency of the rights revolution and a powerful 
consequentialist justification to reverse decades of discrimination, affirmative 
78. Ibid at 378.
79. See Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265, 98 S Ct 2733 (1978) [Bakke]; 
Gratz v Bollinger, 539 US 244, 123 S Ct 2411 (2003) [Gratz]; Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 
306, 342 (2003) [Grutter]; Fisher v University of Texas at Austin, 133 S Ct 2411 (2013). A 
further case to defend affirmative action was heard at the US Supreme Court in October 
2013. At the time of writing, judgement was on reserve. See Schuette v Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action, 134 S Ct 1623, 188 L Ed 2d 613 (2014) [Schuette]. 
80. Supra note 79. The US Court established limits to the kind of affirmative action that may be 
employed.
81. Sander, supra note 76 at 385.
82. Dawna Tong & W Wesley Pue, “Best and Brightest? Canadian Law School Admissions” 
(1999) 37:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 843 at 855.
83. Ibid at 854.
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action has always been seen as a temporary measure, necessary in the short term 
to close the representation gap and level the playing field.84 However, changing 
ethnic representation in law school was only one step in implementing an effective 
program for meaningful diversity promotion.85 Because affirmative admissions 
policies do not directly address the underlying social forces that create exclusion in 
the first place, diversity factors in law school admissions have been found to offer 
only band-aid solutions.86 The rising cost of law school tuition, the continued 
use of the LSAT (despite credible evidence that the test is itself discriminatory),87 
law school assessment methods (namely, grading and ranking),88 and the tepid 
implementation of affirmative action at some American schools have “combined 
to depress the number of minorities that are accepted and that ultimately graduate 
from law school and sit for the bar exam.”89 In Canada, a qualitative review of the 
University of Windsor’s Faculty of Law admissions conducted in the late 1990s 
found that the school’s access policy constituted “one tool for increased racial 
diversity,” but that “[a]dditional measures (over and above the passage of time) 
may be needed to achieve further racial diversity among members of the legal 
profession, including changes during law school and beyond.”90
84. See Grutter, supra note 79 at 343 (O’Connor J stating, “We expect that 25 years from now, 
the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the [diversity] interest 
approved today”).
85. See Johanna KP Dennis, “Ensuring a Multicultural Educational Experience in Legal 
Education: Start with The Legal Writing Classroom” (2010) 16:4 Tex Wesleyan L Rev 613 
(“Admitting more students of color does not necessarily correlate into more competent 
attorneys of color being admitted to the bar” at 631-32).
86. Okechukwu Oko, “Laboring in the Vineyards of Equality: Promoting Diversity in Legal 
Education Through Affirmative Action” (1996) 23:2 SUL Rev 189 at 212. 
87. William C Kidder, “Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in 
Educational Attainment? A Study of Equally Achieving ‘Elite’ College Students” (2001) 
89:4 Cal L Rev 1055 (arguing that the LSAT is culturally biased in the sense that it creates 
an artificial barrier to entering the legal profession). See also Phoebe A Haddon & Deborah 
W Post, “Misuse and Abuse of the LSAT: Making the Case for Alternative Evaluative Efforts 
and a Redefinition of Merit” (2006) 80:1 St John’s L Rev 41.
88. Delgado, “Rodrigo’s Tenth Chronicle,” supra note 73 (arguing that students admitted under 
affirmative action are evaluated based on constructions of “merit” that are rooted in historical 
patterns of exclusion at 1712-14).
89. Patricia A Wilson, “Recreating the Law School to Increase Minority Participation: The 
Conceptual Law School” (2010) 16:4 Tex Wesleyan L Rev 577 at 578.
90. Blonde et al, supra note 75.
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As much as affirmative action admissions programs can be justified under 
theories of equality,91 their practical value remains empirically contested.92 Many 
indicators suggest that the experience of racial minorities, once they are admitted 
to law school, is shaped by continued patterns of social and professional exclusion 
and academic underperformance. For example, a study of a number of American 
law school affirmative action programs revealed high rates of attrition of students 
admitted through such programs.93 There remain ongoing problems of retention 
and completion of law school by minority students.94 Evidence also suggests 
that minority students are “more at-risk, are more in need of academic support, 
are more likely to leave law school for financial reasons, and are more prone to 
failing the bar exam.”95 Among elite American law schools, minorities are most 
often concentrated in the bottom half of their classes.96 Poor performance in 
law school makes it harder to graduate and more onerous to launch a career in 
legal practice. While these difficulties cannot be traced causally to law school 
admissions policies alone, it is clear that well after the introduction of affirmative 
action, the minority experience in law school continued, to a surprising extent, 
91. See Gratz, supra note 79. The US Supreme Court held that a “minority quota” system of 
affirmative action violated the equal protection rights of white applicants. In the sister 
case, Grutter, the US Court held that using race as one among many factors in university 
admission decision-making was not unconstitutional. See Grutter, supra note 79. In Canada, 
s 15(2) of the Charter provides that the equality guarantee “does not preclude any law, 
program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged 
individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” See supra note 24.
92. See e.g. Sander, supra note 76 at 370 (suggesting that minority students would be better off 
attending lower-ranked law schools to which they can be admitted without the need for 
affirmative action). Contra David L Chambers et al, “The Real Impact of Affirmative Action 
in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study” (2005) 57:6 
Stan L Rev 1855.
93. Sander, supra note 76.
94. Carole J Buckner, “Realizing Grutter v. Bollinger’s ‘Compelling Educational Benefits of 
Diversity’ – Transforming Aspirational Rhetoric Into Experience (2004) 72:4 UMKC L Rev 
877 (linking lack of engagement with minority issues in class with feelings of alienation by 
minority law students at 888).
95. Dennis, supra note 85 at 630 (also citing the fact that the ABA has identified students 
of colour as “at-risk” with respect to passing the bar examination). See also Anupama 
Ramlackhan, “Leveling the Playing Field in Law School: A Look at Academic Assistance 
Programs for Minority Law Students” (2006) 1:1 J Race, Gender & Ethnicity 27 at 31; 
Sander, supra note 76 at 426-67.
96. Wilson, supra note 89 at 581.
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to be shaped by the same patterns of exclusion and obstruction that members of 
those communities experience outside legal education.97 
Affirmative action admissions programs have been found to work best when 
paired with robust academic support throughout law school.98 This approach 
helps to alleviate the ingrained tendency of legal education to exclude members 
of historically disadvantaged or outsider communities.99 But it also highlights 
that, notwithstanding the positive goals of affirmative action, structural obstacles 
to many minority students do not disappear simply because they are admitted to 
law school. Indeed, academic support may help to mitigate exclusion by enabling 
outsider students to navigate the extra hurdles they face in a structurally adverse 
environment. It does not, however, on its own, remedy the underlying causes 
of exclusion.
No doubt, affirmative action has removed some barriers and created new 
opportunities that did not exist before. Increasing access to legal education for 
members of historically excluded groups has enabled certain minorities to move 
from ‘outsider’ to ‘insider’ status and to achieve professional success. But it has 
also created new challenges in a social landscape shaped by underlying systemic 
inequalities. For these reasons, it is helpful to remember that affirmative action 
has always been understood by its primary defenders and by the courts as a tool, 
not a goal. In terms of diversity, affirmative action can help create the conditions 
for achieving meaningful diversity in the law school by constituting a statistically 
diverse student body.100 This is, however, a precondition to the more important 
97. See e.g. Rachel F Moran, “Diversity and its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at 
Boalt Hall” (2000) 88:6 Cal L Rev 2241 at 2283-2285 (finding issues of race and gender 
“largely ignored” within the law school curriculum at 2269); Walter A Allen & Daniel G 
Solorzano, “Affirmative Action, Educational Equity and Campus Racial Climate: A Case 
Study of the University of Michigan Law School” (2001) 12:2 Berkeley La Raza LJ 237 
(describing a sample law school environment as replete with segregation and racial conflict). 
For recent findings, see Feingold & Souza, supra note 70 (concluding in a 2013 study at 
UCLA Law School that “[r]acial unevenness and its concomitant burdens are a reality for 
Students of Color at UCLA Law ... [which is] likely far from unique in this regard” at 114). 
98. See Ramlackhan, supra note 95. See also Richard Cabrera & Stephanie Zeman, “Law School 
Academic Support Programs—A Survey of Available Academic Support Programs for the 
New Century” (2000) 26:1 Wm Mitchell L Rev 205. 
99. See Adam G Todd, “Academic Support Programs: Effective Support Through a Systemic 
Approach” (2002-2003) 38:1 Gonz L Rev 187 at 189 (noting the contributions that 
academic support programs have made to law schools generally).
100. Similarly, diversity in faculty is a related, though distinct, issue. See generally Kellye Y 
Testy, “Best Practices for Hiring and Retaining a Diverse Law Faculty” (2011) 96:5 Iowa L 
Rev 1707.
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task of incorporating diversity into the way we understand legal knowledge, skills, 
reasoning, rules, and authority, and how these things are conveyed pedagogically.
B. CURRICULUM AND TEACHING REFORM: MAKING OUTSIDERS INSIDERS
The second area of first-wave diversity promotion in the law school came in modest 
curriculum reform that led to the diversification of course offerings. This area has 
been well studied in Canada. Scholars refer to seminars that focus on experi-
ential and theoretical perspectives of members of marginalized communities as 
“outsider” courses.101 Like affirmative action in admissions, reform that incorpo-
rates outsider courses into the curriculum is justified on equitable grounds for 
providing a space to pay special attention to the relationship between law and 
marginalized groups: “Outsider courses offer the very real possibility of creating 
environments in which otherwise silent voices have not only space, but credibility 
and perhaps even power.”102
Indeed, framing cases in terms of a particular perspective can give voice to 
questions and commentary about issues of identification for law students who 
may not otherwise find opportunities in core curriculum courses to explore such 
issues. One of the first “outsider” courses taught in Canada was “Women and the 
Law,” offered in 1972-73 at Osgoode Hall Law School.103 At the time, Osgoode’s 
upper-year student population of 518 included 69 women.104 With time, the 
relative enrolment in feminist courses declined as the variety and volume of 
outsider offerings multiplied, especially by the 1990s.105 Yet, while critical and 
outsider perspectives could be found on the periphery, little was altered in the 
core of legal education. Most North American law schools persisted in a failure to 
integrate critical, counter-dominant discourses and social commentary about the 
101. Natasha Bakht et al, “Continuing Outsiders: A Critical Exploration of Outsider Course 
Enrollment in Canadian Legal Education” (2007) 45:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 667.
102. Ibid at 674.
103. Ibid at 694.
104. Osgoode Hall Law School historical class records. These figures are derived from the 
graduating class lists of 1973 and 1974, the members of which would have comprised the 2L 
and 3L classes in the 1972-1973 academic year [on file with author].
105. Todd, supra note 99 at 696-98; Bakht, supra note 101 at 669-70.
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law adequately into the core curriculum.106 Even as law schools have moved away 
from “legal fundamentalism” and embraced socio-legal approaches, this has been 
matched by a curious persistence of the narrow, doctrinal pedagogical tradition. 
Despite the resilience of its traditions, the content, form, and methods of 
legal education have always been subject to critique: “For a century or more, legal 
scholars (and some thoughtful practitioners and judges) have one way or another 
insisted upon the indeterminacy of legal decisions, the historical contingency 
of legal institutions and processes, and the cultural variability of what people 
understand ‘law’ to be.”107 The American Legal Realists of the early twentieth 
century highlighted the gap between doctrinal study and the lived experience of 
law, focusing on the disjuncture between appellate decision-making (the focus of 
law school instruction) on the one hand, and the reality of legal practice on the 
other.108 Decades later, critical race and feminist scholars brought their experiences 
with the law to their scholarly interpretations. They developed compelling 
critiques of traditional case-method instruction for its tendency to express the 
law in abstractions and marginalize lived experiences of the law, especially those 
of members of disadvantaged groups.109 
The critical race and feminist perspectives on law created a discourse linking 
the general observations of the legal realists and the critical legal studies movement 
with a race- and gender-conscious exposition of law in all its manifestations: 
doctrine, legal reasoning, institutions, professional responsibility and ethics, 
and, of course, legal education. Perspectives grounded in subjective experiences 
of minorities, such as queer, disabled, Indigenous, and Latino, among others, 
gave rise to numerous offshoot branches of critical scholarships. Literature in 
106. See Richard Delgado, “The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights 
Literature” (1984) 132:3 U Pa L Rev 561 at 563 (critiquing the closed “inner-circle” of 
academic legal commentary, particularly in prestigious publications). See also Matsuda, 
“Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge,” supra note 29 (describing the “segregation” or 
“apartheid in legal knowledge” between established scholarly authority and “outsider” women 
and people of colour at 2-5); Duncan Kennedy, “Legal Education and the Reproduction of 
Hierarchy” (1982) 32:4 J Legal Educ 591. 
107. Harry Arthurs, “‘Valour Rather Than Prudence’: Hard Times and Hard Choices for Canada’s 
Legal Academy” (2013) 76 Sask L Rev 73 at 83 [Arthurs, “Valour Rather Than Prudence”] 
(referring to the Canadian academy). For the American experience, see Spencer, supra note 4 
(tracing 130 years of American critique of doctrinal legal education).
108. See Brian Leiter, “American Legal Realism” (University Texas Public Law Research Paper No 
042, 2002) at 8, online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=339562>.
109. See e.g. Crenshaw et al, supra note 66; Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, eds, Critical Race 
Theory: the Cutting Edge (New York: The New Press, 1995); Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, 
“Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners” (1993) 91:8 Mich L Rev 2025.
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law reviews, especially from the 1990s onwards, began to capture the perspective 
of racialized faculty and reflect critical discourses. Many such faculty members 
meditated on issues in the law school, including facing hostility from students for 
raising racial justice issues in doctrinal or “core” courses.110 
The critique of law as complicit in historical and ongoing systemic racial 
oppression, which was a core claim of the critical race school, is linked to a critique 
of the practices and assumptions of legal education. Curricula tied to appellate 
doctrine rather than contextual understandings of law-in-action diminish the 
realities of minorities’ lives under the law. Unengaged and outmoded methods 
of instruction, such as the case method and Socratic dialogue, heighten existing 
power imbalances in the classroom, reward entitlement, and make outsiders feel 
even more alien. Evaluation methods that reflect a biased ordering of lawyering 
knowledge and skill—placing, as these do, abstract analytical reasoning at the 
top and experienced subjective realities at the bottom—again arbitrarily magnify 
perspectives of privileged law students while minimizing those of minority 
students. And a faculty composition that remains largely ethnically homogeneous 
causes minority students to doubt the credibility of law schools’ commitments 
to diversity.111 
110. Robert S Chang & Adrienne D Davis, “Making Up Is Hard to Do: Race/Gender/Sexual 
Orientation in the Law School Classroom” (2010) 3:1 Harv J L & Gender 1; Peter Goodrich 
& Linda G Mills, “The Law of White Spaces: Race, Culture, and Legal Education” (2001) 
51:1 J Legal Educ 15; Armstrong & Wildman, supra note 68.
111. See Larry Chartrand et al, “Law Students, Law Schools, and their Graduates” (2001) 20 
Windsor YB Access to Just 211. Citing gender and ethnic representation figures at a number 
of Canadian law school faculties in 1992, the authors conclude:
From even this limited amount of data, we can identify systematic patterns across the schools. 
There was a clear lack of diversity in faculty composition. Although women made up approxi-
mately 50% or more of the student population in each of the five schools, they held only a 
minority of faculty positions. Aboriginals and visible minority faculty members were even less 
common. We note that faculty composition may have changed since our study was completed 
(ibid at 216-17).
 Even as most faculties now have strong female representation, and there are many examples 
of female law school deans, the pace of racial representation has been markedly slower. 
See Ornstein, supra note 9 at 14 (observing that, in 2006, 17.6 per cent of all university 
professors in Ontario were visible minorities—the percentage is likely much lower within law 
faculties—while they constituted more than 20 per cent of the total population).
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Little is done to educate students of colour uniquely about what it means 
to be a lawyer of colour.112 Meanwhile, white students who do not actively seek 
out racialized perspectives on the law are likely to spend negligible time reflecting 
on the differential impact of law on non-majority sectors of society. This has 
led some to call for a program of multicultural “hypereducation,”113 whereby all 
students are instructed about the linkages between the reality of diversity and 
the norms of equality. This would be successful only if embedded in core legal 
instruction, not shunted to the periphery of the curriculum. The justification for 
such a proactive approach to diversity can be traced back to the public function 
of the lawyer and the unique power and influence that attach to legal profes-
sionalism. The goal of an explicit commitment to multicultural education is to 
produce the “Atticus Finches of tomorrow today.”114 Both white and non-white 
students stand to benefit and learn from a diversity pedagogy that is rooted 
in a commitment to substantive equality. A student’s personal experience as a 
racialized person, for example, does not predetermine his competency to meet 
the needs of the culturally diverse, minority client. Nor does a student’s whiteness 
necessarily prevent her from empathizing with the condition of a racial minority. 
In a “multicultural hypereducation” curriculum, instructors actively subvert 
stereotypes and biases and help students to see how the law operates to reinforce 
social, cultural, and economic status markers, and show how the law can be 
deployed to challenge existing hierarchy and power imbalances. 
Outsider courses keep outsider perspectives on the periphery of legal 
education and do little to transform the core. Students who do not initiate 
contact with outsider perspectives are unlikely to encounter such perspectives, 
and if they do, it is likely to pass as a missed opportunity.115 If the goal is to 
draw attention to perspectives on law that are analytically important, then the 
question is whether doing so by way of optional, specialized, segregated courses 
will generate the kind of change needed to make marginal voices more relevant 
to mainstream legal analysis. If calls for legal education reform include more 
focus on practical knowledge and applied skills, the relevance of outsider course 
material will become significant. No serious conception of “practice readiness” 
112. A 2013 empirical study at UCLA Law School measuring racial “unevenness” found that 
“Students of Color experienced far greater levels of stigma consciousness than their White 
colleagues.” Meanwhile, “White UCLA Law students overwhelmingly proceed through law 
school without ever consciously thinking about their own whiteness.” See Feingold & Souza, 
supra note 70 at 112-13. 
113. Dennis, supra note 85 at 632.
114. Ibid.
115. Feingold & Souza, supra note 70 at 112-13. 
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can neglect the importance of cultural competencies and an appreciation for 
the interplay of law, power, and privilege. Shifts in accreditation and standard-
setting offer an opportunity to reorient legal pedagogy towards integrating the 
understanding of subjective experiences of law with skills, theory, and doctrine. 
What the above suggests is that without significant curriculum reform, 
first-wave efforts over-promise with respect to diversity. Though not universally 
true, a segment of the minority student community that tends to strongly identify 
as racialized and that pervasively manifests that identity can expect to experience 
law school as alienation in many, if not most, respects. Targeted admission can 
come at a high personal cost for minority students, forced to carry burdens that 
members of dominant social groups do not have to shoulder.116 In finding refuge 
in outsider courses, students risk permanently labelling themselves outsiders to 
the legal mainstream, setting an even steeper uphill path to professional success. 
All of this can have the effect not only of perpetuating historical patterns of racial 
disadvantage, but also of creating new patterns of insider-outsider exclusion.117 
This effect contributes to the perpetuation of historical patterns of exclusion in 
the law school and in the legal profession, even as some members of histori-
cally excluded groups excel and succeed in conventional career paths that may 
previously not have been available to members of their communities. 
C. DIVERSITY AND ACCESS TO THE PROFESSION
Nowadays, it is not only morally desirable for law schools to showcase diversity, it 
also can benefit a law faculty’s profile. The law school can attract the brightest stars 
from racialized communities by offering a diverse and welcoming environment, a 
sampling of perspective courses with attractive titles, and a system of professional 
counselling and supported access to the competitive job market. However, while 
the law school is the forum in which students are typically first introduced to law 
firms, it is the firms and members of the profession, not the school, that determine 
the students’ access to professional training, entry to professional culture, and 
opportunities for employment. The schools deliver graduates to the profession 
but have no authority over student job placement or firm hiring decisions.
In a very meaningful sense, then, law firms hold the key to professional access 
for many students. In Ontario, as in all Canadian provinces, every law graduate 
116. Ibid (arguing that “racial unevenness arises from environmental factors and institutional 
culture independent from any identifiable perpetrator” at 73).
117. See Sander, supra note 76 (describing the “cascade effect” caused by an over-representation of 
blacks in elite law schools, leaving an ever wider divide between black and non-black students 
at lower-tier law schools at 410-11).
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must secure a training position under the stewardship of a senior member of the 
profession.118 This makes student trainees119 literally beholden to the members 
of the profession—and, increasingly, to the law firms—to admit them to profes-
sional membership. Despite the dominance of law firm involvement in formal 
law graduate training through articling programs, law firms fall outside the 
regulatory purview of law societies and bar associations.120 With the gradual 
move away from articling requirements and a decreased reliance on law firms 
for training, the responsibility for training “practice-ready” graduates now more 
than ever falls on the law schools.121 Thus, if students experience exclusion and 
underperformance in law school, they are more likely to encounter systemic 
obstacles in their career.
Indeed, the numbers in Ornstein’s research suggest only modest and slow 
change in the diversity direction at all levels of legal practice.122 There is plenty 
of cause for concern upon closer analysis of the data.123 At the general level, the 
places where diversity inadequacies remain virtually unchanged are in the highest 
levels of influence and authority. Whether in the law firms, the law schools, or 
the judiciary, racial and ethnic minorities are not only underrepresented, they are 
118. In Ontario, a supervising lawyer must have three years’ experience at the bar. This was 
lowered from ten years in response to a growing “articling crisis” in the province, whereby 
estimates reach 15 per cent as the number of law graduates unable to qualify for the bar due 
to lack of articles. On 22 November 2012, the Pathways pilot project was launched, allowing 
lawyer licensing candidates to complete a Law Practice Program (LPP) as an alternative 
to articles, starting in the 2014-15 licensing year. See The Law Society of Upper Canada, 
Pathways to the Profession: A Roadmap for the Reform of Lawyer Licensing in Ontario (Final 
Report of the LSUC Articling Task Force, 25 October 2012) at 13, online: <http://www.
lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147489848>. A concern is that the LPP 
alternative will stigmatize underprivileged and under-represented minorities, who are less 
likely to secure traditional articles. See Jean Ko Din, “Ryerson law practice program nets 
praise, skepticism” The Ryersonian (26 November 2013), online: <http://www.ryersonian.ca/
ryerson-law-practice-program-nets-praise-skepticism>.
119. “Student” is the designation for graduates of accredited law programs in Ontario who are 
receiving training through articling or the law practice program prior to their admission to 
the bar. “Law student” refers to a student enrolled in an accredited law degree program in 
Canada. See Law Society of Upper Canada, By-law 4, Licensing, ss 33, 34, online: <http://
www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147485805>.
120. See Adam M Dodek, “Regulating Law Firms in Canada” (2012) 90:2 Can Bar Rev 383.
121. See supra note 6 and accompanying discussion (concerning practice readiness as a core 
competency for the purpose of law school accreditation).
122. Supra note 9 at i-ii, 5, 7, 9, 18.
123. For example, the data illustrate for the first time clear evidence of massive disparities between 
different social groups, such that some minorities are statistically over-represented in law 
school, while others are under-represented. See ibid.
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virtually absent, especially from upper echelons.124 Law school commitments to 
diversity offer the promise of a self-fulfilling career in the law, in a legal culture that 
celebrates difference and accommodates a multitude of perspectives. However, 
when students enter the profession, they encounter a world that is slow to change 
and is rooted in a culture that will appear foreign and inhospitable to many. For 
the minority student who has already experienced alienation in legal education, 
it may be an unsurprising realization to be out of place in the profession. Given 
the pattern of female attrition from the large law firms following the rapid entry 
of women into the profession,125 racial diversity statistics suggest that a similar 
pattern might already be underway among racial and ethnic minorities.126
124. Diversity Institute, Improving Representation in the Judiciary: A Diversity Strategy (Toronto: 
Ryerson University, 2012) at 14; Diversity Institute, “Research from Ryerson University 
Finds Increased Representation of Women in Canada’s Judiciary, but Visible Minorities Left 
Behind” (27 June 2012), online: <http://www.ryerson.ca/diversity/news/2012-06-27.html> 
(noting that “[v]isible minorities are all but absent among Federal appointments to the courts 
and the selection process”). Ornstein observes that:
In Ontario in 2006, members of a visible minority accounted for 30.7 percent of all physicians, 
31.7 percent of engineers, 17.6 percent of academics and 11.8 percent of high-level managers, 
compared to 11.5 percent of lawyers. This suggests that potential immigrants who are already 
lawyers in countries with dissimilar legal structures believe they will be unable to translate their 
skills in Canada as easily as other professionals. Even immigrants who come to Canada when 
they are young children are disadvantaged in pursuing a legal career.
 See supra note 9 at ii. See also Carasco v University of Windsor, 2012 HRTO 195 (CanLII) 
(application filed with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) alleging systemic 
racial discrimination in a law school decanal appointment process and highlighting a history 
of white privilege in law school governance).
125. See e.g. The Law Society of Upper Canada, Consultation Report: Retention of Women in 
Private Practice Working Group (Toronto: LSUC, 2008) at 114, online: <http://www.lsuc.
on.ca/media/retentionofwomen.pdf>; Law Society of Upper Canada, Change of Status 
Research, 2010-2012: Report of the Key Findings Submitted to the Law Society of Upper Canada 
(Toronto: LSUC, May 2013) at 36, online: <http://lsuc.on.ca/ChangeofStatus2013>.
126. Elizabeth H Gorman & Fiona M Kay, “Racial and ethnic minority representation in 
large U.S. law firms” (2010) 52 Studies in Law, Politics & Soc’y 211 at 213. Gorman 
and Kay argue: 
[I]t is likely that minority underrepresentation in law firms is largely shaped by their dispro-
portionately elevated rates of attrition, which have been described as ‘devastatingly high’ and 
a mass ‘exodus’, rather than by low rates of entry. Associates are more likely to exit when 
they perceive their future prospects in a firm as unattractive. In the case of minorities, such 
perceptions are often realistic.
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IV. TOWARDS DIVERSITY PEDAGOGY 
The law school is a site of production not only of lawyers, but also of law itself. 
Through decisions about faculty composition, student admissions, research, and 
curriculum, law faculties determine the knowledge, skills, and priorities that 
define and constitute the law to a greater extent than they have tended to acknowl-
edge.127 The law school also transmits and assimilates the norms, behaviours, and 
ethics that shape the professional identity. There are implications to the claim 
that the law school establishes—or plays a significant role in establishing—the 
normative approach to law and lawyering. 
Diversity pedagogy offers an account of legal education that weaves diversity 
into the forms and practices of law. To achieve this, diversity pedagogy seeks to 
move beyond thinking about how to make the dominant legal establishment 
more accessible to “outsiders,” to a more concentrated focus on revising and 
reorienting the definitions and functions of lawyering. This involves a reorienta-
tion of law school pedagogy and administration to produce an institutional and 
professional culture, reflected in curriculum, that is expressly and comprehen-
sively built on equality-positive assumptions. 
Diversity pedagogy is both a theoretical and practical program.128 While 
I do not seek to prescribe a specific set of pedagogical instruments, exercises, 
or experiments to implement the general prescriptions offered here, we can 
recognize that law teachers perform two sets of functions: they choose and define 
the scope and content of legal knowledge; and they transmit that knowledge 
through doctrinal instruction, practical and skills training, and ethical framing. 
127. Law schools never have absolute discretion to determine curricular content and educational 
programming. In the United States, the American Bar Association (ABA) accredits law 
schools and most state bar associations only permit graduates of ABA-accredited institutions 
to be admitted to practice. In Canada, the Federation of Law Societies and provincial law 
societies play a similar role. Since about 1960, an informal agreement between the Canadian 
legal academy and the professional regulators allowed the law schools to determine with 
virtually no oversight the content of legal education. It has been noted that “this mutually 
beneficial détente ended abruptly in 2009” when, “[f ]or the first time in the recent history 
of Canadian legal education, the profession’s governing bodies were formally asserting their 
claim to be entitled to tell law schools what they must teach, to whom, and to some extent, 
how.” See Arthurs, “‘Valour Rather Than Prudence,’” supra note 107 at 81.
128. This is a description of the theoretical basis on which a pedagogy of promoting meaningful 
and impactful diversity norms could and, in my view, should be pursued. The task of 
experimenting with implementing theory is another project altogether. As a teacher who 
attempts to implement ideas of diversity pedagogy, my theoretical frame is certainly informed 
and shaped by classroom experience. 
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By harmonizing the core functions with a properly theorized diversity 
commitment and by implementing them alongside targeted, diversity-enhancing 
institutional initiatives, these pedagogical methods can and should be applied 
creatively and flexibly across different law school settings according to local 
diversity needs and goals. 
A. BEYOND CELEBRATING DIFFERENCE: MEANINGFUL REPRESENTATION
To overcome the insufficiency of first-wave measures, and to promote a more 
robust conception of diversity, law schools will no doubt have to continue to 
work to diversify law school classrooms, in terms of both admitting minority 
students and appointing minority faculty members. But it has become clear that 
the benefits of diversity do not flow automatically upon adjusting representation. 
Evidence suggests that minorities typically either assimilate intellectually and 
culturally in order to succeed in law school and in practice or do not assimilate 
and experience law school and professional life as alienation. While representa-
tion is, normatively, a defensible and necessary condition, it is but a partial and 
preliminary measure. What is needed is the development of a more thorough 
program of diversity/equality, both in legal education and in the profession.
Enhanced academic support and the introduction of “outsider courses” have 
been important for meeting minority students’ needs and affirming their place 
inside the law school. However, these types of measures offer false comfort; while 
they may ease the student’s entry to and passage through law school, they do 
not provide a vehicle for meaningful engagement with diversity issues, nor do 
they resolve for the minority student the homogenizing pull within conventional 
legal pedagogy. What is required is an approach to teaching and training that 
integrates critical voices within legal education and scholarship, and embraces the 
pedagogical centrality of pluralist narratives in legal history, doctrine, analysis, 
and reasoning. Far too little scholarship has been devoted to developing the 
connections between pluralist and counter-dominant approaches to law and 
the qualities of good lawyering.129 This seems to be where the most important 
work for diversity pedagogy lies: in creating space for different ways to think and 
behave as a lawyer, not only as a matter of competent service delivery, but also as 
a matter of individual self-fulfilment. 
Indeed, if diversity demands the celebration of difference as a way of 
promoting equality, there must be some content to the kinds of differences 
129. Trevor CW Farrow, “Ethical Lawyering in a Global Community” (Osgoode Hall Law School 
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research Paper No 9/2013) at 13, 
online: <http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/258>.
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that are celebrated within the diversity paradigm. Diversity also demands a 
re-evaluation of the kinds of norms that shape the professional model, or range 
of models, to which students aspire. Normative writers have focused on infusing 
the reconstructed lawyer model with a commitment to advance justice, promote 
equality, and “do no harm.”130 How this infusion is achieved involves tailoring 
legal education both to reorient the prevailing model of lawyering and change the 
characteristics of professional self-image. 
The goal for a reformed legal education should be to present the possibility 
of a lawyer identity to which any student can ascribe or aspire not because it 
is neutral but because it is inclusive. This can assist in combatting some of the 
adverse effects of diversity’s vulnerability, such as the attrition of women and 
minorities from the profession.131 By reorienting all aspects of legal reasoning, 
analysis, doctrine, and practice to align with the practical, moral, and political 
commitments implied in a diversity ethic, the law school can lead a reform 
agenda that can be expected to have long-term, lasting impact not only on legal 
education, but also on the entire legal profession. 
B. TEACHING TRANSFORMATION: IMPLEMENTING INCLUSION
The primary theoretical challenge of implementing diversity in legal education is 
to determine how best to subvert the dominance of the inherited models, critically 
assess what is valuable (and what is not), and then work on improving approaches 
to legal education to reflect the professional norms of a reconstituted idea of what 
legal analysis and practice are. Transforming professional norms, practices, and 
behaviours is no modest task in a profession that is generally resistant to change:
Employing only modest poetical licence, it could be said that nothing fundamental 
distinguishes present educational practices from those of Toronto in 1968 or Van-
couver in 1945, Winnipeg in 1925, Halifax in 1900 or Oxford in 1885. Contem-
porary common law legal education takes its form from schemes launched by elite 
Anglo-Canadian lawyers a century ago.132
130. See e.g. David Tanovich, “Law’s Ambition,” supra note 23 (articulating an approach to 
ethical responsibility rooted in the promotion of justice). See also Rosemary Cairns Way, 
“Reconceptualizing Professional Responsibility: Incorporating Equality” (2002) 25:1 Dal 
LJ 27 (proposing an equality-seeking ethic as a core professional responsibility); Duncan 
Kennedy, “The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of Their Causes” (1987) 18:4 Texas 
Tech L Rev 1157 (urging a “do no harm” ethic, stating, “Try your best, oh graduating 
students…, to avoid doing harm with your lawyer skills” at 1158).
131. See Ornstein, supra note 9; CBA, Touchstones, supra note 9; ABA, Next Steps, supra note 9.
132. Rochette & Pue, supra note 58 at 169 [emphasis in original].
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The traditional form of legal education has helped reinforce the dominant 
culture of the profession, described through most of its history as “xenophobic, 
elitist and generally aligned with capital  interests against ordinary citizens.”133 
Responding to this legacy with repudiation, scholars in the legal ethics field 
have used history as moral justification for fundamentally reconceptualizing the 
role of the lawyer in the legal system and in society.134 The project of linking 
ethics and professionalism to mainstream legal education is as much aligned 
with the diversity imperative as it is a further example of outward pressures on 
the scope of what is considered “relevant” and “central” to understanding the 
law.135 Legal ethics necessarily speaks to theoretical and practical questions about 
legal education.136 As ethics becomes a more directed focus of attention in the 
profession, the teaching of legal ethics and modelling of professional conduct 
will reach even greater importance. With this confluence, normative ethics and 
diversity pedagogy overlap considerably. 
There is also, as always, constant reciprocal influence between the law schools 
and the legal profession. The firms rely on law faculties to supply their existing 
service systems with competent graduates. As law firms have played a decreasing 
role in lawyer training over the past several decades, they have come to rely 
increasingly on the law schools to produce “practice-ready” graduates. But the 
profession also looks to the academy to explain the law, and to describe the legal 
imagination and scope of possibility. With the focus on law firm hiring processes, 
the extent of influence that the legal academy has over the future of the profession 
is often underestimated in the face of the perceived dominance of the profession 
(large firms in particular) over present job prospects for students. 
All of this is to emphasize that law schools are natural leaders in shaping the 
law and should boldly embrace diversity pedagogy with a view to transforming 
133. W Wesley Pue, “In Pursuit of Better Myth: Lawyers’ Histories and Histories of Lawyers” 
(1995) 33 Alta L Rev 730 at 762-63.
134. The emerging field of Canadian legal ethics demonstrates a strong push towards 
incorporating diversity values and justice principles into the model lawyer. See e.g. Adam M 
Dodek, “Canadian Legal Ethics: A Subject in Search of Scholarship” (2000) 50:1 UTLJ 115; 
Dodek, “Ready for the Twenty-First Century,” supra note 22; HW Arthurs, “Why Canadian 
Law Schools Do Not Teach Legal Ethics” in Kim Economides, ed, Ethical Challenges to 
Legal Education & Conduct (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 1998) 151; Allan Hutchinson, 
“Calgary and Everything After: a Postmodern Re-vision of Lawyering” (1998) 33:4 Alb L 
Rev 768.
135. See W Wesley Pue, “Becoming ‘Ethical’: Lawyers’ Professional Ethics in Early Twentieth 
Century Canada” (1991) 20:1 Man LJ 227.
136. See e.g. David Tanovich, “Learning to Act Like a Lawyer: A Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility for Law Students” (2009) 27:1 Windsor YB Access Just 75.
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classrooms and curricula, as well as norms that constitute the core values and 
priorities of the profession.
V. THEORY + PRACTICE + REFLECTION
Give the pupils something to do, not something to learn; and the doing is of such a na-
ture as to demand thinking, or the intentional noting of connections; learning naturally 
results.137 
If diversity in legal education is the goal, this article has thus far suggested that 
institutional strategies have failed to promote a meaningful conception of that 
goal. Diversity pedagogy calls for a reconceptualization of the normative model 
of lawyering that is produced in law school. Part V(A), below, provides a general 
proposal of how that can be achieved. I argue, first, for disrupting the “science 
of law” approach that has dominated the core of legal education for more than 
a century. This is not to turn the study of law into an anti-intellectual exercise, 
but rather to enhance and make more meaningful student engagement with 
the study of law. There is little intellectual value in a method that mutes lived 
experiences and emphasizes abstractions over realities. Next, I argue that the 
concept of “practice readiness” is the wrong focus of skills training, but is not 
necessarily a wrong-headed approach. With sufficient and appropriate theoretical 
grounding, critical tools, and structured reflection, “skills training” can provide 
an environment where, to quote John Dewey, “learning naturally results.” To 
this end, I connect the diversity imperative to the theory, forms, and specific 
outcomes of experiential education. 
A. THE DOMINION OF DOCTRINE
Traditional legal pedagogy relies heavily on the “case method” of instruction. 
Despite curriculum modifications, the case method remains the dominant 
mode of doctrinal instruction in the first-year curriculum and in much of the 
upper-year offerings at law schools across Canada and the United States.138 The 
case method is rooted in an understanding of legal analysis as a science. It seeks 
to organize the law into a system of knowable, predictable, and neutral rules and 
137. John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New 
York: MacMillan, 1916) at 181.
138. Spencer, supra note 4.
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principles that can be applied generally in any fact situation.139 In teaching the 
law from this perspective—with a focus on the abstract rules—law comes to be 
understood as a coherent system of conclusions, reached through a process of 
objective analytical reasoning.
It is widely understood that the case method as a sole mode of legal instruction 
is unduly narrow. The American Legal Realists of the early twentieth century 
took aim at its excessive reliance on formalistic application of principles under a 
pretence of neutrality and predictability, oblivious to context. They argued that 
legal education must do more than teach cases in order to prepare future lawyers 
adequately for the contextual contingencies of real-world lawyering.140 Because 
the case method mutes or excludes factors that are arguably relevant in any given 
case, this can have an objectifying impact on members of minority groups who 
identify with the “other” side of a rule in the face of a dominant frame that treats 
rules as inherently objective, legitimate, and fair.141
The case method is also criticized for failing to account for arbitrary factors, 
such as the personal characteristics and political preferences of judges exercising 
decision-making power.142 It inadequately considers social-fact variables and 
leaves no room for serious self-critique within the discourses of legal analysis and 
reasoning. The case method assumes that legal language is rational and effective, 
that precedents deserve respect, that the Constitution is legitimate, that formal 
justice is just, that litigants are generally equal, and that the rule of law is the 
best bulwark against tyranny. Yet, the case method’s attachment to assumptions 
that only make sense when presented in the abstract can create actual alienation 
for students who have experienced or witnessed the law in ways that challenge 
these underlying assumptions. Objectivity and neutrality in legal analysis, 
presented without critique or caution in traditional case-method reasoning, 
can have exclusionary effects in legal education when it discounts as irrelevant 
non-conformist and diverse perspectives:
[B]ecause of the dominant view in academe that legal analysis can be taught without 
directly addressing conflicts of individual values, experiences, and world views, these 
conflicts seldom, if ever, reach the surface of the classroom discussion. Dominant 
beliefs in the objectivity of legal discourse serve to suppress the conflict by discount-
139. For a classic articulation of the science of law approach, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
“The Path of the Law” (1897) 10:8 Harv L Rev 457 (describing the “body of dogma or 
systematized prediction which we call the law” at 458).
140. See Jerome Frank, “A Plea for Lawyer-Schools” (1947) 56:8 Yale LJ 1303 at 1315.
141. Crenshaw, “Race-Conscious Pedagogy,” supra note 29 at 6.
142. See Leiter, supra note 108 at 8 (outlining the various strands of this critique within 
Realist writings).
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ing the relevance of any particular perspective in legal analysis and by positing an 
analytical stance that has no specific cultural, political, or class characteristics.143 
Thus, the depersonalization and decontextualization of the law in traditional 
case-method analysis tends to accentuate the exclusionary impact of law on 
some minority students. The challenge is that this depersonalization of the law is 
part of what the case method claims as foundational to its posture of neutrality. 
Many law professors do highlight the false pretensions of neutrality and colour-
blindness in judicial interpretations. But this is no easy task: faculty who attempt 
to integrate perspectives (critical, racial, feminist, et cetera) into legal analysis risk 
being accused of lacking objectivity, propagandizing, or failing to teach relevant 
material.144 This is a direct by-product of the case method, which devalues social 
context and critical theoretical approaches. If students are taught that doctrine 
is all that matters, they will resist attempts at diversifying the content of core 
courses. Student responses are a reflection of the values and priorities set by the 
law school. Individual instructors, despite assurances of academic freedom, have 
little incentive to be creative or experimental in the delivery of “core” subjects.145 
Stated commitments to diversity and transformation do little to change student 
expectations when the curriculum and classroom reproduce traditional priorities 
and privilege established perspectives. 
B. LEARNING LAW BY DOING LAW: BROADENING SKILLS
One of the primary functions of North American law schools is to prepare JD 
graduates for the legal job market and to begin the students’ socialization into 
professional culture. Teaching students how to read a case and to understand its 
logic and principles imparts an important competency, but is just one of many 
143. Crenshaw, “Race-Conscious Pedagogy,” supra 29 at 2.
144. Chang & Davis, supra note 110.
145. The reasons for this are many, including formal and informal pressures to cover huge 
amounts of material, market-consumer pressures to conform to dominant forms of 
instruction, and institutional pressures for teaching to be more “efficient.” See Herbert N 
Ramy, “Moving Students from Hearing and Forgetting to Doing and Understanding: A 
Manual for Assessment in Law School” (2013) 41:4 Capital UL Rev 837 at 885. Ramy 
argues that: 
[C]hange [in teaching and evaluation methods] will not come easily because it must take place 
at every level of the law school. Administrators must reward faculty who engage in innovative 
teaching practices, not just those who publish most frequently. Teachers must be willing to 
spend the time needed to modify their current teaching practices to incorporate the more 
frequent assessments of their students. Finally, students must become willing participants in 
their own education so that they can become independent lifetime learners (at 885). 
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skills a new lawyer needs and may not be the most important one. According to 
an emerging consensus amongst law teachers, law schools must do more than 
teach doctrine, especially as technology makes access to legal information and 
knowledge much easier: 
Lawyers need to know how to investigate legal issues they have not studied before, 
and how to keep abreast of changes in the law over the years. They also must rec-
ognize that in a world of many legally-trained people and multiple sources of legal 
information, knowing ‘the law’ alone will be insufficient to set them apart and cause 
a client to seek out their services.146 
The law school experience needs to provide some added value. As such, law 
teachers now realize they must focus not only on cognitive knowledge, but also 
on identity and skills-based knowledge.147
The task of achieving a generally well-trained and practice-ready law graduate 
will be the challenge for the future of legal education. Recent reports suggest 
even more dramatic declines in law school applications in the United States than 
previously known,148 with less dramatic though similar patterns in Canada.149 The 
value of expensive legal education in a struggling economy is in question. This 
fact presents further obstacles to diversity and access. How “practice readiness” is 
defined will lie at the centre of the struggle between regulators and law schools 
over how best to make legal education relevant to professional preparedness. The 
outcome of this project will determine whether the future role of law schools is to 
shape, or be shaped by, the legal profession. For reasons based on sound evidence 
and pedagogical theory, and in decisions taken without regulatory pressure, 
many law schools have undertaken to make experiential education a centrepiece 
146. Thomas D Morgan, “The Changing Face of Legal Education: Its Impact on What it Means 
to Be a Lawyer” (2012) 45:4 Akron L Rev 811 at 832.
147. Carnegie Report, supra note 5 (listing six tasks that law schools must perform: (1) teach basic 
knowledge and research; (2) build students’ capacity to engage in complex practice; (3) 
develop students’ professional judgment in conditions of uncertainty; (4) teach how to learn 
from experience; (5) introduce students to a professional role and identity; and (6) encourage 
contributions to the public service at 22).
148. See Law School Admission Council, End of Year Summary: ABA Applicants, Applicants, 
Applications, Admissions, Enrollments, LSATs, CAS (2014), online:<http://www.lsac.org/
lsacresources/data/lsac-volume-summary>.
149. See e.g. Ontario Universities’ Application Centre, Law School Application Statistics (2013), 
online: <http://www.ouac.on.ca/statistics/law-school-application-statistics>.
BHABHA, TOWARDS A PEDAGOGY OF DIVERSITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION 101
of their reform agenda.150 Linking diversity goals to the framework of experien-
tial education cannot only bridge theory and practice, it can also bring diverse 
perspectives and experiences to the core of the study of law. This latter possibility 
has received very little attention.
C. IN FROM THE MARGINS: MAINSTREAMING EXPERIENTIAL EDUCATION
The basic formula for experiential pedagogy (theory+practice+reflection) is not 
completely new to legal education, though it has attracted revitalized interest 
in recent years.151 Practical training in law through apprenticeship was, up until 
the late nineteenth century, the primary method of legal education throughout 
the common law world.152 The “science of law” approach, pioneered at Harvard 
Law School in the 1870s, quickly replaced apprenticeship and became the new 
norm.153 This transition to university-based legal education came about as legal 
practice became both more complex and the bar became more organized. The 
law school model was defined by characteristics that directly suppressed and 
delegitimized the practice-based approach to learning law: It relied on the case 
method and Socratic teaching, which prioritized the “mastery of principles and 
doctrines” as opposed to skills and habits; it appointed professors with no prior 
practice experience and cloistered them in ivory tower faculties; and it required a 
significant lengthening of the academic program to three years to accommodate 
the growing amount of material deemed essential to the study of law.154 
The Langdellian model was never impervious to criticism. The American 
Legal Realists first raised the idea of “clinical” legal education as a complement to 
150. For example, in 2010, a university-wide mandate to promote experiential education was 
adopted after much deliberation at York University in Toronto, where Osgoode Hall Law 
School is housed. Beginning with the 1L cohort of 2012-2013, the law school implemented 
a requirement to complete a designated amount of experiential credit hours in order to 
graduate from the JD program. See Patrick Monahan, “Building an Engaged University: 
Strategic Directions for York University 2010-2020” (April 2010), online: York University 
<http://vpap.info.yorku.ca/files/2012/09/White_Paper_Overview_April_15.pdf> (stating 
that “there will be a significant increase in opportunities for students to participate in an 
experiential education activity, both domestically and internationally, as a component of their 
degree program” at 12). See also Carnegie Report, supra note 5.
151. Roy Stuckey et al, Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a Road Map (Columbia, 
SC: Clinical Legal Education Association, 2007); Carnegie Report, supra note 5.
152. Spencer, supra note 4 at 1956-58.
153. Ibid at 1974-75. 
154. Ibid at 1975-76.
(2014) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL102
classroom-centred, case-focused studies.155 The emergence of the Law and Society 
movement,156 and the influence of radical left politics on university campuses in 
the 1960s, generated a normative foundation from which modern clinical legal 
education was born.157 Legal clinics departed from the “doctrines and principles” 
focus to develop an activist pedagogy that aspired to link lawyering practices to 
a reform social agenda.158 The clinic was an incubator of “rebellious” lawyering 
and helped pave the way to transforming the conceptual understanding of the 
lawyer, from stylized technician to dynamic social actor and lawmaker.159 This 
approach was motivated by an opposition to the conventions that persisted in 
most law schools, along with a desire to increase access to justice for the poor 
and vulnerable. The role of the lawyer in the clinic was not simply to apply and 
explicate formal rules. Clinical students learned how to challenge and reinterpret 
rules, problem-solve and set norms in a fact-based, client specific, socially 
contingent context. To do this, it became apparent that the law student would 
need much more than grounding in abstract principles and doctrine.
Thus, the clinic provided a venue for student creativity and energy, while also 
highlighting the importance of skills training and “learning by doing.” Writing in 
1974, just three years after the first clinical programs were established at Osgoode 
Hall Law School, professor W.H. Angus observed that “we can no longer justify 
the narrowness of our teaching vehicles… . Law schools have only begun to 
scratch the surface in clinical training.”160 Indeed, in addition to teaching skills 
and providing access to justice to the poor, clinics helped students understand the 
law through the eyes of the people affected by it. This enabled the development of 
155. See e.g. Jerome Frank, “Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School” (1933) 81:8 U Pa L Rev 907 
at 910 (critiquing the use of case books and the focus on judicial opinion, to the exclusion 
of other relevant factors in teaching the law); Karl N Llewellyn, “The Current Crisis in 
Legal Education” (1948-1949) 1:2 J Legal Educ 211 (critiquing the case study method and 
urging a curricular shift in law school towards the acquisition of “craft skills,” an early call for 
clinical legal education at 213). 
156. See Garth & Sterling, supra note 65.
157. See Jeff Giddings et al, “The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United 
States, Britain, Canada, and Australia” in Frank S Bloch ed, The Global Clinical Movement: 
Educating Lawyers for Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 3-8.
158. Julie Macfarlane, “Bringing the Clinic into the 21st Century” (2009) 27:1 Windsor YB 
Access Just 35 at 36.
159. Gerald Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano’s Vision of Progressive Law Practice (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1992).
160. WH Angus, “The Individual and the Bureaucracy: Judicial Review – Do We Need It?” 
(1974) 20:2 McGill LJ 177 at 211-12. Nearly thirty years later, the promise of clinical legal 
education in Canada was still largely unrealized. See Rose Voyvodic, “Considerable Promise 
and Troublesome Aspects” (2001) 20:1 Windsor YB Access Just 111 at 112. 
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a vision of pedagogy and practice that would be responsive to the lived impact of 
law and the structural reality of power differentiation. Clinical educators saw legal 
education as an instrument of social transformation, wherein a commitment to 
justice could be promoted through the dual methods of client-centred lawyering 
and student-centred learning.161 
Over the years, clinical programs have evolved to incorporate experien-
tial pedagogical theories and to reflect the established best practice formula, 
consisting of theoretical framing, practical instruction, and structured personal 
reflection.162 Clinical legal education began on the periphery of the law school 
curriculum. Today, clinical programs exist at a majority of law schools and have 
overcome early antipathy to earn credence as a valuable and enriching way of 
teaching and learning. Not all current clinics are tied to a progressive or leftist 
political orientation, though many still are.163 Some law faculties have clinics 
focusing on business law, intellectual property law, appellate advocacy, or 
in-house representation of government and corporations. Despite the embrace of 
clinical methods across subject areas and fields, clinical legal education remains 
conceptually distinct from mainstream legal education. Clinical programs, siloed 
and often physically removed or disconnected from the law school, are viewed 
as an alternative or complement to the all-important doctrinal instruction that 
occurs in the lecture hall. Students are aware of the value of a clinical program but 
also of the stigma that may arise from having “too much” clinical experience on a 
transcript. Such students may be seen as lacking the intellectual mitre to endure 
traditional instruction, assumed to be weak in doctrine or unable to engage in 
high-level legal analysis, or viewed simply as too caring or too political.
The historical marginalization of clinics has already been mitigated by the 
gradual mainstreaming of experiential education. The value of learning law in 
the clinics is, at minimum, threefold. First, it escapes the pedagogical focus 
on abstracting doctrine from facts and context, substantially widening what is 
relevant to learning and practising law. Second, clinical legal education offers 
real-life settings in which to apply diverse forms of legal knowledge and abilities 
161. See Janet E Mosher, “Legal Education: Nemesis or Ally of Social Movements?” (1997) 
35:3-4 Osgoode Hall LJ 613; Lucie E White, “The Transformative Potential of Clinical Legal 
Education” (1997) 35:3-4 Osgoode Hall LJ 603 at 605.
162. See Nigel Duncan, “Ethical Practice and Clinical Legal Education” (2005) 7:1 Int’l J Clinical 
Legal Educ 7 at 18 (arguing that the ideal clinical instructor is steeped in education theory 
and has practice experience). 
163. See Sameer M Ashar, “Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization” (2008) 14:2 Clinical L Rev 
355 (noting that clinical legal education has, from its inception, eluded clear definition, 
subject to debates about its purpose, meaning, and potential).
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to actual case studies, rewarding different student competencies and skillsets.164 
Third, it employs critical reflection to nurture professional and personal growth, 
self-healing, and socially responsible and ethical behaviour through the apprecia-
tion of the lived impact of law and legal practice. Thus, the mainstreaming of 
clinical legal education offers possibilities beyond promoting access to justice for 
members of disadvantaged communities through on-campus and community 
clinics, fostering students’ political consciousness, and appealing to student desire 
for hands-on experience and skills acquisition. The lessons learned from clinical 
education offer unique opportunities to further mainstream experiential learning 
by incorporating it into the core of legal education as a vehicle for advancing 
diversity pedagogy. 
D. EMPLOYING EXPERIENTIAL EDUCATION TO PROMOTE DIVERSITY
There are many ways in which experiential education can integrate and promote 
diversity pedagogy. First, it can break away from the subject-area dominance of 
traditional legal education and seek understandings of legal problems through 
the eyes of differently affected individuals or groups. Such a socio-legal approach 
can remedy the depersonalizing, abstracting tendency in traditional legal analysis. 
It helps reorient the focus of study from the rule to the process. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, it teaches legal principles as contextualized by facts. 
This is in contrast to the case-method approach of extricating the ratio, and then 
rationalizing the facts according to pre-set analytical frames. Such a shift allows 
for destabilizing epistemological assumptions, and widens the scope for diverse 
contributions to the production of legally relevant knowledge.165
Second, experiential learning promotes diversity because it generally employs 
more diverse evaluation methods than does traditional legal education.166 It is well 
known that end-of-term, high-stakes examinations reward particular cognitive 
skills that only narrowly capture the skillsets required to be a good lawyer.167 
Evaluation in an experiential learning setting tends to gauge a student’s progress 
over time and with an assortment of evaluative tools. This allows students both to 
demonstrate their talents in various ways and to develop at their own pace. Experi-
164. Voyvodic, supra note at 160 at 117.
165. See Crenshaw, “Race-Conscious Pedagogy,” supra note 29.
166. See Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, “Leading Change in Legal Education—Educating Lawyers and 
Best Practices: Good News for Diversity” (2008) 31:4 Seattle UL Rev 775 at 777-79.
167. Ian Weinstein, “Testing Multiple Intelligences: Comparing Evaluation by Simulation and 
Written Exam” (2001-2002) 8:1 Clinical L Rev 247 (observing that law school grades are not 
a useful measure or predictor of success as a lawyer at 248-49).
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ential learning provides an educational setting where different kinds of students 
will perform well. It upsets the grades hierarchy that takes hold so quickly in law 
school and may help doctrinally strong students identify other skills that need 
development prior to encountering difficulties in real-world practice. 
Third, experiential pedagogy is more collaborative, both horizontally and 
vertically. The experiential teacher is fundamentally different from the traditional 
lecturer in style, approach, and method. The lecture style is detached, didactic, 
and impersonal. To the extent that it is dialectical, it thrives on confrontation 
and is burdened by a tradition of classroom authoritarianism that has unproven 
pedagogical value (e.g., the Socratic method).168 Experiential education follows a 
model of student-centred education, whereby the instructor is a mentor or guide, 
facilitating the student’s self-learning. The student discovers and produces the 
knowledge herself, making connections through the act of doing. As Dewey put 
it, “learning naturally results” from being placed in a setting with “something to 
do,”169 rather than in the role of passive recipient of the instructor’s knowledge, 
as in lecture-based learning. Similarly, because experiential methods encourage 
cooperation with fellow students and make the interests of clients (live or 
simulated) paramount, students are more likely to work as collaborators and 
allies in problem-solving and knowledge production, rather than as competitors 
pursuing narrow personal interests (i.e., scarce high grades). 
The ways in which experiential education promotes diversity also align with 
traits commonly attributed to members of the “millennial generation,” who now 
constitute the majority of the North American law student body.170 Such charac-
teristics include the desire to work collaboratively, a wish to be mentored and 
nurtured, a drive to do good in the world, and an easy comfort with diversity 
168. Todd E Pettys, “The Analytic Classroom” (2012) 60:5 Buff L Rev 1255 at 1268-74 (noting 
that pure Socratic teaching has disappeared from US law schools for a variety of reasons, 
including inefficiency and alienation produced by it).
169. Supra note 137.
170. Emily A Benfer & Colleen F Shanahan, “Educating the Invincibles: Strategies for Teaching 
the Millennial Generation in Law School” (2013) 20:1 Clinical L Rev 1 (summarizing 
research about millennials). The authors make the case for generational generalizations while 
acknowledging that characteristics cannot be presumptively attributed to all members of the 
generation.
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and difference.171 While experiential education helps mitigate the deficiencies in 
traditional education by showing legal rules and practices in action, an experien-
tial approach to legal education need not be predicated on an outright rejection of 
classroom or lecture-based learning. What is clear is that each style or pedagogical 
mode rewards different skillsets, delivers distinct educational outputs, and may 
naturally cater to different types of students. What is also true is that, in the 
appropriate conditions and with competent instruction, any law student should 
be able to learn under either mode. The ideal legal education would include 
elements of both doctrinal and experiential learning.172 Indeed, an important 
task for scholarship on legal education in the coming years will be to analyze and 
prescribe methods for integrating and harmonizing doctrinal and experiential 
learning. 
The strongest accounts of experiential education champion it as the “most 
effective pedagogic device for forcing students to address a full agenda of intellec-
tual and social issues.”173 The live-client experience gives students the opportunity 
to deal with “unstructured situations,” learn how to think through actual profes-
sional issues, and study and strategize the law in complex social contexts. 
Applying the law in the complexities of context and as part of actual legal process 
could make experiential learning a superior method of understanding doctrine, 
as compared with extracting abstract principles from appellate dicta. This, of 
course, depends on the availability of sufficient theoretical grounding through 
competent supervision and faculty support throughout the learning process. 
Such a foundation is essential to ensure that the value of hands-on experience is 
not reduced to mere skills acquisition.
It is also important to note that not all experiential education occurs 
in a live-client clinic, and not all of the benefits of experiential learning will 
necessarily accrue to the student in each and every one of these settings. Experi-
ential education provides general benefits simply from learning by doing, with 
reflection. This formula can be delivered in a rather diverse array of formats 
171. Ibid at 7-9. Benfer and Shanahan describe members of this generation as people who
[are] comfortable in both virtual and physical space … appreciate and expect diversity and 
are collaborative … [are] trusting of people over 30 and eager to learn from and work with 
older mentors … [are] confident, team oriented, conventional, achieving, and ambitious … 
are service and cause-oriented and want to contribute to the greater good … are forward 
looking, opportunity driven, ready to contribute … know what they want and believe they 
can achieve it … [and have] a greater awareness of and comfort level with diversity of all kinds 
than previous generations.
172. This is a claim that is echoed in policy documents, such as the Carnegie Report. See supra note 5.
173. Voyvodic, supra note at 160 at 111.
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that is broader than what is traditionally understood as clinical legal education. 
It might include, for example, simulated experiences, such as role-play and 
mooting. What makes it experiential is fundamentally not whether there is a real 
client or an actual issue, but rather whether the form of instruction is problem-
based. That is, whether it includes the application of theory and doctrine to a 
practical situation, the opportunity to engage in the act of doing, and a structure 
for reflection about performance and the process afterwards.
If experiential education is delivered in a manner that conforms to the 
best practices, as they evolve, diversity pedagogy can be expected to contribute 
positively to legal education in at least four ways:
1. Subverting the myth of universality. Legal education excels when it 
ensures space for different voices and distinct or overlapping perspec-
tives on, and experiences with, the law and when it encourages 
students to craft their own professional identity, rather than try to 
fit into a predetermined role.
2. Deconstructing power relationships. Law schools can realign power 
and can empower students not just with the credential of a law 
degree, but also with a consciousness of diversity involving profes-
sional responsibility, ethics, empathy, and competence. This 
portrays the lawyer as an agent of change. 
3. Stimulating culture shift in the profession organically by training 
students to develop a socially responsible professional self-image, to 
be contributors to the profession, and to realize the transformative 
potential of their role as lawyers in the broader society. As opposed 
to reading law as a body of fixed and determinate text, this kind of 
diversity invites students to view law as both normatively pluralistic 
and strategically positivist. 
4. Making lawyers better communicators, who are able to explain and 
translate the law to clients across various sources of difference. In 
this sense, diversity necessarily incorporates aspects of transnational 
fluency, inter-cultural sensitivity, and global awareness.
VI. CONCLUSION
The implications of embracing a pedagogy of diversity as a governing feature of 
contemporary legal education would be significant. Fully implemented, diversity 
pedagogy would enable the promotion not only of basic principles of access and 
representation, but also of a thicker conception of diversity as a normative goal, 
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shaped by values of equality and pluralistic understandings of law and lawyering. 
Diversity pedagogy can, and should, touch on all aspects of law school life, from 
the doctrinal classroom to clinical placements to career counselling. The kinds of 
outcomes that will emerge depend on the particular context and circumstances in 
any given setting. For this reason, educators should focus on diversity-enhancing 
processes rather than on achieving specific outcomes. With time, best practices 
will emerge.
The tools for implementing the goals of diversity pedagogy are to be found 
in innovative teaching methods. The embrace of experiential education offers 
a timely opportunity to harmonize different strands of law school reform to 
meet mutually reinforcing ends. What emerges from the aspiration of diversity 
pedagogy is a model of professional competence and skill that includes a series 
of attractive and admirable professional qualities, which can be contrasted with 
outmoded and discredited approaches to legal professionalism. The diversity-
trained law student will be emotionally intelligent, as opposed to dispassionate 
or suppressed; experientially informed, as opposed to abstracted and artifi-
cially ‘neutral’; empathetic and personally invested, as opposed to detached 
and indifferent; and critical and creative, not just within established doctrinal 
boundaries but also in theoretical inquiry and practice techniques. As such, 
rather than being doctrinaire or merely strategic about ethical rules, the diversity-
trained law student will engage in critical self-reflection and nurture a professional 
culture rooted in ethical conduct.
 
